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COUNTRY CLUB DISCRIMINATION AFTER 
COMMONWEALTH V. PENDENNIS 
Alison Lasseter*
Abstract: In American country clubs, there is a long tradition of dis-
crimination against racial minorities and women. These clubs maintain 
that they are private and thus able to operate free from government 
sanction. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled that the state’s 
Commission on Human Rights had the statutory authority to investigate 
private country clubs to determine if they discriminate in their mem-
bership practices. In Kentucky, if a club is found to discriminate, its 
members are disallowed certain tax deductions. While this is a step in 
the right direction to end discriminatory practices at country clubs, the 
Supreme Court of Kentucky still points out that private clubs have the 
right to discriminate without fear of legal liability. This Note evaluates 
other states’ reactions and statutes regarding discrimination at private 
clubs and contends that such approaches are more effective in eradicat-
ing discrimination in these clubs than tax consequences. 
Introduction 
 Augusta National Golf Club (Augusta National), constructed in 
1931 in Augusta, Georgia is one of the most prominent golf courses in 
the world.1 It has hosted the Masters tournament for almost seventy 
years and has included members such as President Eisenhower, who 
joined the club in 1948.2 Augusta National’s beautiful scenery is dis-
played through the magnolia trees that line the club, individually se-
lected plants that decorate and name each of the eighteen holes and 
a variety of plants that have been added to the landscape since the 
                                                                                                                      
* Executive Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2005–2006). 
1 See Charles P. Charpentier, An Unimproved Lie: Gender Discrimination Continues at Au-
gusta National Golf Club, 11 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 111, 130 (2004); The Ofªcial Site of 
the Masters Tournament, History of the Club, http://www.masters.org/en_US/history/ 
jacket/club_history.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). 
2 See Charpentier, supra note 1, at 138; The Ofªcial Site of the Masters Tournament, 
Frequently Asked Questions at the Masters http://www.masters.org/en_US/info/faq/ 
index.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). The Masters is a prestigious and public golf tour-
nament held annually at Augusta National. Charpentier, supra note 1, at 111, 138. It is one 
of the sport’s four major championships. See Michael McCarthy & Erik Brady, Privacy Be-
comes Public, USA Today, Sept. 27, 2002, at 1C. 
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course was built.3 Although the grounds of Augusta National are aes-
thetically pleasing and diverse, the club’s members are not very dif-
ferent, but are instead similar in appearance and background.4
 Much controversy has surrounded Augusta National over the past 
few years as a result of its exclusive membership policies.5 The club 
refuses to admit women, and of the approximate 300 members, fewer 
than ten are African-American.6 Unfortunately, Augusta National’s 
exclusionary policies are not unique, as discrimination against racial 
minorities and women is a deep seeded tradition in American country 
clubs.7 History shows that the country club is “one of the least diverse 
                                                                                                                      
3 See The Ofªcial Site of the Masters Tournament, Landmarks, http://www.mas- 
ters.org/en_US/course/landmarks.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). 
4 See id.; McCarthy & Brady, supra note 2, at 1C. Augusta National is a men’s only golf 
club. Id. Journalists McCarthy and Brady point out that the club’s members “are a who’s 
who of corporate power and old money.” Id. It is the deªnition of an “old boys club,” in 
that the average age is seventy–two, more than a third of the members are retired, and the 
majority are a part of “old-line industries,” such as banking, oil and manufacturing. Id. 
Only twenty–ªve of Augusta’s 199,570 residents are members. Id. As of July 2002, only six 
of the nearly 300 member club were African-American. See Charpentier, supra note 1, at 
131–32. 
5 See Charpentier, supra note 1, at 112; Scott R. Rosner, Reºections on Augusta: Judicial, 
Legislative and Economic Approaches to Private Race and Gender Consciousness, 37 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 135, 135 (2003); Gary Mihoces, Burk Wants Federal Ofªcials out of Exclusionary Clubs, 
USA Today, Apr. 1, 2003, at 3C. Martha Burk, chair of the National Council of Women’s 
Organizations, has led an unrelenting campaign to open membership at Augusta National 
to women. See Mihoces, supra, at 3C. On the other side of the argument, a Ku Klux Klan 
splinter group applied for a protest permit in order to demonstrate at the 2003 Masters to 
show support of the exclusionary policy. See Charpentier, supra note 1, at 112 n.11. Joseph 
J. Harper, the imperial wizard of the American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, said, “[t]his 
equal rights stuff has gotten out of hand.” Id. 
6 See Rosner, supra note 5, at 136. Augusta National’s new members are nominated by 
current members and as a result, one cannot apply for membership. See McCarthy & 
Brady, supra note 2, at 1C. The club did not admit its ªrst African-American member until 
1990 and did so as a result of problems involving a tournament at Shoal Creek Golf and 
Country Club, an all-white Alabama club. See Charpentier, supra note 1, at 131. The Profes-
sional Golfers Association (PGA) Championship took place at Shoal Creek only after it 
admitted its ªrst black member and Augusta National followed suit a month later. Id. 
Rosner contends that the “barriers to African-American golfers . . . were largely ig-
nored by the popular press until a much-publicized interview in 1990.” Rosner, supra note 
5, at 179. When asked about Shoal Creek’s racially discriminatory admissions policy weeks 
before the club hosted the 1990 PGA Championship, the president and co-founder of the 
club, Hall Thompson, responded, “[t]he country club is our home and we pick and 
choose who we want . . . . I think we’ve said we don’t discriminate in every other area ex-
cept for blacks.” Id. When questioned whether members brought African-American guests 
to the club, Thompson stated, “that’s just not done in Birmingham.” Id. at 179–80. 
7 See Rosner, supra note 5, at 136. 
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American institutions by design.”8 The membership of Augusta Na-
tional and many other present day clubs reveal that this tradition of 
prejudice continues.9
 While country clubs have been condemned over the years for 
their discriminatory membership practices, most clubs assert the de-
fense that they are distinctly private and thus able to operate and dis-
criminate free from government sanction.10 In response, many states 
have taken steps to eradicate discrimination in private clubs by 
broadly interpreting and writing their public accommodations laws or 
by enacting legislation that speciªcally targets these clubs.11 A recent 
example of this kind of state approach occurred in Commonwealth v. 
Pendennis Club, decided in 2004 by the Supreme Court of Kentucky 
(Kentucky Court).12 In that case, the Kentucky Court held that the 
Kentucky Commission on Human Rights (the Commission or KCHR) 
had the authority to investigate private country clubs to determine if 
they deny membership based on race.13 If the Commission concludes 
                                                                                                                      
8 Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, Chipping Away at Discrimination at the Country Club, 25 Pepp. L. 
Rev. 495, 495 (1997). Country clubs were generally created by wealthy Caucasian Protes-
tants between 1880 and 1930 and were never meant to be welcoming to everyone. See id. at 
495–96. Allegedly, President Kennedy was once questioned by his Secretary of Labor, fu-
ture Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, about his membership to the Links Country 
Club because of its exclusion of Jews. Id. at 495 n.3 (citing Frank Whelan, Few Minorities at 
Country Clubs, Allentown Morning Call, June 5, 1997, at D1). President Kennedy re-
portedly chuckled and replied, “[h]ell, Arthur, they don’t even allow Catholics.” Id. 
In some cases, because of the discriminatory policies, those excluded opted to form 
their own country clubs that discriminated against other minority groups. See id. at 496. 
For example, when wealthy Irish and German Jewish Americans were denied membership 
to Protestant-only country clubs, they formed their own private clubs and excluded Italians 
and African-Americans. See id. 
9 See Rosner, supra note 5, at 136. 
10 See id. at 137. 
11 See John P. McEntee & Walter J. Johnson, Teed Off: Female Golfers Seek Equal Access, N.Y. 
L.J., Dec. 8, 2000, at 1, 6. For example, some states deny liquor licenses to clubs that dis-
criminate as to who can be a member, while other states eliminate tax exemptions for 
these clubs. Id. 
12 See generally 153 S.W.3d 784 (Ky. 2004). 
13 Id. at 789. The Pendennis case started 14 years ago after Louis Coleman ªled com-
plaints against the Pendennis Club, the Louisville Country Club, and the Idle Hour Coun-
try Club claiming that they used discriminatory membership practices. Id. at 786. A 2002 
article about private clubs in Kentucky describes the Pendennis Club in Louisville as a 
social club where the city’s “business and political leadership have entertained, wined, 
dined and networked.” Lisa Summers, Behind Closed Doors, The Lane Rep., Sept. 2002, 
http://www.kybiz.com/lanereport/issues/september02/behindcloseddoors.html. Unlike 
Augusta National, the Pendennis Club allows women access in all areas of the club, but did 
not do so until 2001, 120 years after its opening. Id. The Club’s three ºoors contain a li-
brary, dining and meeting rooms, a men’s athletic area, a squash court and a main ball-
room. Id. In 2002, the Club had around 800 members, all of whom had been approved for 
 
314 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 26:311 
that a club discriminates in its membership practices, Kentucky law 
prohibits members from taking tax deductions for amounts paid to 
the club.14
 Pendennis is an important decision that upholds the Kentucky 
Commission on Human Rights’ authority to look into the practices of 
private clubs and “refuse[s] endorsement” of discriminatory conduct 
by disallowing tax deductions to members.15 Yet, questions remain re-
garding whether the state is doing enough to end racist and sexist poli-
cies at country clubs.16 The Kentucky Commission on Human Rights’ 
mission is “[t]o eradicate discrimination in the Commonwealth 
through enforcement of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.”17 While 
Pendennis was a victory for the KCHR, this Note argues that in light of 
other state statutes and cases, there may be other measures that Ken-
tucky can take to accomplish more fully the KCHR’s goal of eradicating 
discrimination.18
 Part I of this Note presents a brief history of the KCHR and how 
it attempts to eradicate discrimination. Part II provides an overview of 
the constitutional, legislative and U.S. Supreme Court precedent that 
involves private club discrimination. Part II also discusses the reason-
ing behind Pendennis and its implications for the effectiveness of the 
KCHR. Part III examines what other states, like California and Con-
necticut, have done to ensure that county clubs will end their dis-
                                                                                                                      
membership by a board of directors. Id. Its literature described Pendennis as “a gathering 
of friends, where decency, decorum, civility, good manners and the social graces are still 
very much in style.” Id. 
14 See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141.010(11)(d) (taxpayers) (LexisNexis 2003); Id. 
§ 141.010(13)(f) (corporations); Pendennis, 153 S.W.3d at 789. 
15 See Pendennis, 153 S.W.3d at 789. 
16 See id. The Kentucky Court explicitly states that the case is not about whether clubs 
actually discriminate nor the rights of the clubs or their members. Id. at 785. In further-
ance of this idea, the Kentucky Court clearly makes the point that private clubs “have a 
statutory right . . . to discriminate in affording the beneªts of membership without fear of 
legal liability.” Id. 
17 See Kentucky Commission on Human Rights, Our Mission, http://www.state.ky.us/ 
agencies2/kchr/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Our Mission]. 
18 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571d (West 2004); Warªeld v. Peninsula Golf & 
Country Club, 896 P.2d 776, 798 (Cal. 1995) (holding that the country club in question 
was a business establishment and thus subject to the state’s civil rights act); Joseph B. 
Chervin, It’s Not Just Your Father’s Game Anymore: Recent Connecticut Legislation Prohibits Gender 
Discrimination at Golf Country Clubs, 8 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. & Pol’y 175, 177–79, 
187–89 (1997–1998) (discussing the Connecticut statute that expressly prohibits discrimi-
nation at golf country clubs); Rosner, supra note 5, at 158–66, 171–91 (addressing federal 
and state legislation pertinent to the issue as well as proposing alternative solutions to the 
problem of country club discrimination); Our Mission, supra note 17. 
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criminatory membership policies. This Note concludes with recom-
mendations for Kentucky to help rid country clubs of discrimination. 
I. History and Overview of the Kentucky  
Commission on Human Rights 
 Since the 1960s, the Kentucky General Assembly has passed laws 
and established a Commission to address issues of discrimination.19 
The KCHR is a state agency that was created by the Kentucky legislature 
in 1960 “to act only as a forum for minority groups in seeking peaceful 
Solutions to racial problems.”20 The Kentucky Civil Rights Act, which 
prohibits discrimination in employment and places of public accom-
modation, was passed in 1966, and a Fair Housing Law was passed in 
1968, protecting against discrimination in housing.21 Although 
amended over the years, the Kentucky Civil Rights Act presently pro-
hibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, disability, 
national origin, age, smoking and familial status in housing situations.22
 Eleven commissioners, who are appointed by the governor, review, 
guide and approve the day to day activities of the executive director 
                                                                                                                      
19 See Kentucky Commission on Human Rights, Overview of the Kentucky Commission 
on Human Rights, http://www.state.ky.us/agencies2/kchr/aboutkchr.htm (last visited Jan. 
15, 2006) [hereinafter Overview]. The Kentucky General Assembly is a bicameral legisla-
ture comprised of 38 Senate and 100 House of Representative seats. Kentucky Legislature, 
Legislative Branch of Government, http://lrc.ky.gov/legproc/lbranch.htm (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2006). Bills are introduced in the House or Senate, referred to a standing commit-
tee, and if approved, returned to the chamber in which they were introduced for voting. 
Kentucky Legislature, How a Bill Becomes Law, http://lrc.ky.gov/legproc/how_law.htm 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2006). 
20 See Overview, supra note 19. Most states have similar agencies created by their respec-
tive legislatures. See generally Connecticut Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities 
Homepage, http://www.state.ct.us/chro/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2006); Massachusetts Commis-
sion Against Discrimination Homepage, http://www.mass.gov/mcad/ (last visited Jan. 15, 
2006); Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission Homepage, http://www.phrc.state.pa.us/ 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2006). For example, the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and 
Opportunities was America’s ªrst ofªcial civil rights agency, created in 1943 by state law. See 
Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, Connecticut Civil Rights Law 
Chronology, http://www.state.ct.us/chro/metapages/lawchron.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 
2006). 
21 See generally Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344 (LexisNexis 1997); Overview, supra note 19. 
The Civil Rights Act outlines the KCHR’s powers and duties, such as, “to conduct research 
. . . and publish reports on discrimination . . . to receive and investigate complaints of dis-
crimination and to recommend ways of eliminating any injustices occasioned thereby,” and 
“to make an annual report to the Governor of its activities.” § 344.180 (2), (3), (7). 
22 See  § 344.120. The last change to the Kentucky Civil Rights Act was made in 1994 
when the Kentucky General Assembly amended the Act to prohibit discrimination in em-
ployment based on age. See Overview, supra note 19. 
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and staff at the KCHR.23 The Commission’s major focus is receiving, 
investigating and carrying out complaints ªled by Kentucky citizens.24 
Any person who believes that he or she has been affected by a discrimi-
natory practice or act may ªle a complaint with the KCHR, which in 
turn, “collect[s] and summarize[s] the evidence” to see if there is prob-
able cause that discrimination has occured.25 If probable cause exists, a 
formal attempt to settle the case is made, and if achieved, “a written 
Consent Agreement” is signed and submitted to the KCHR for ap-
proval.26 If a settlement cannot be reached, the case is tried at an ad-
ministrative hearing with a KCHR attorney representing the complain-
ant and a hearing ofªcer or appointed commissioner presiding.27 A 
ªnal order by the KCHR is binding, although either party may ap-
peal.28
 After Pendennis, the KCHR has the ability to respond to com-
plaints about country clubs by going through the investigative and 
fact-seeking process described above to determine if discriminatory 
membership practices are employed.29 Prior to the case, the KCHR 
dismissed such complaints, reasoning that the clubs were private and 
thus exempt from the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.30 The KCHR’s con-
                                                                                                                      
23 See Overview, supra note 19. 
24 See id. The KCHR is divided into three separate groups: the Enforcement Branch, 
the Legal Division and the Research & Information Branch. Id. The Enforcement Branch 
handles the case processing when a citizen calls the ofªce or an appointed commissioner 
brings an issue to the staff’s attention. Id. This group also investigates the complaint by 
interviewing parties and reviewing records to determine if there is probable cause. Over-
view, supra note 19. The Legal Division provides legal services to those who allege dis-
criminatory grievances by negotiating conciliation agreements and representing the com-
plainant in an administrative hearing or the state’s court system. Id. Finally, staff members 
who are part of Research & Information coordinate the agency’s ªeld ofªces, community 
relations and public affairs. Id. 
25 See Kentucky Commission on Human Rights, Jurisdiction, http://www.state.ky.us/ 
agencies2/kchr/jurisdiction.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Jurisdiction]. 
26 See id. If the agreement is approved by the KCHR, a Consent Agreement has the 
same effect as a ªnal order. Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. If the KCHR holds that discrimination did occur, a ªnal order may involve a 
“cease and desist order and require further afªrmative action that will eliminate discrimi-
nation.” Id. Such action might include reinstatement to a job, monetary relief or making a 
home or apartment available to the complainant. Id. 
29 See Commonwealth v. Pendennis Club, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 784, 789 (Ky. 2004); Jurisdic-
tion, supra note 25. 
30 Pendennis, 153 S.W.3d at 786. The KCHR dismissed Louis Coleman’s complaints be-
cause the Kentucky Civil Rights Act states that “[a] private club is not ‘a place of public 
accommodation, resort or amusement’ if its policies are determined by its members and its 
facilities or services are available only to its members and their bona ªde guests.” See Ky. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.130 (1) (LexisNexis 1997); Pendennis, 153 S.W.3d at 786. 
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ªrmed power to investigate private clubs is a step forward in accom-
plishing its goal of eradicating discrimination.31
 While country club membership may not appear to be the most 
important source of discriminatory practices, it is a signiªcant and 
timely area for Commissions like the KCHR to pursue.32 For example, 
Scott Rosner, a lecturer at the University of Pennsylvania, argues that 
membership in a private country club generates a business advantage 
because of the networking relationships that are cultivated in the club 
setting.33 Another reason to acknowledge and attack discrimination in 
private clubs is because the discrimination is not so obvious.34 Lastly, 
private club discrimination is a timely issue in that it negatively impacts 
many minority groups.35 Despite the KCHR’s important accomplish-
ment, there may be stronger measures the Commission and states can 
employ to ªght the exclusionary practices in country clubs.36
                                                                                                                      
31 See Pendennis, 153 S.W.3d at 789. 
32 See Rosner, supra note 5, at 138–39, 142. 
33 See id. at 138–39. The exclusion of minorities from membership thus “manifests it-
self” in their exclusion “from signiªcant parts of the marketplace” and “perpetuates the 
socioeconomic differences between the excluded and non-excluded groups.” Id. at 139. 
Terminating discrimination at country clubs, Rosner contends, results in beneªts like, 
“[p]reventing stigmatization, leveling the playing ªeld . . . and promoting diversity.” Id. at 
142. Martha Burk recently expressed this idea when asked if she would attend the 2005 
Masters golf tournament. See Deborah Solomon, Questions for Martha Burk: Women’s Work, 
N.Y. Times Mag., Mar. 6, 2005, at 17. Burk responded, “I wouldn’t go near a golf course. I 
am so disgusted with what I learned about the way corporate America uses golf and how 
women are excluded from the business access that it provides.” Id. 
34 See Jolly-Ryan, supra note 8, at 529. Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, a law professor, makes the 
point that discrimination in private clubs might not seem like a pressing issue when com-
pared to acts like hate crimes, but the fact that the blatant prejudice can be entirely legal 
because of the clubs’ private status may actually be even “more harmful to the excluded 
individuals and society as a whole.” Id. at 528–29. 
35 See id. at 528. Most recently, private country clubs have become defendants in law 
suits involving same-sex partners. See Ann Carrns, Gay Club Members Seek Spousal Rights, 
Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 2004, at A11. Many country clubs have policies of giving privileges to 
members’ signiªcant others, including Druid Hills Golf Club in Atlanta, Georgia. Id. When 
registered domestic partners Lee Kyser and Lawrie Demorest decided to join the club, 
however, they were told that they would each have to join as individuals and pay separate 
$40,000 initiation fees. Id. Dr. Kyser joined anyway and her formal requests for spousal 
status for Demorest have been denied twice. Id. An attorney in Atlanta claims that “the 
legal and political battles that will arise from the Druid Hills case will have a long-term 
impact on how gays are treated in Atlanta and Georgia,” which clearly displays the impor-
tance of the issue. See Cameron McWhirter, High Stakes in City-Club Dispute, Atlanta J. 
Const., Jan. 9, 2005, at 1A. 
36 See Chervin, supra note, 18 at 177–79, 187–89; Rosner, supra note 5, at 158–66, 171–
91. 
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II. Overview and Implications of the Law Behind  
Country Club Discrimination 
 Before understanding Pendennis and its potential effectiveness for 
accomplishing the KCHR’s goal of eradicating discrimination, one 
must be familiar with the constitutional, legislative and U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent that deal with freedom of association and private 
clubs.37 Speciªcally, most private clubs deny that they impose any legal 
harm with their discriminatory practices because of their private status 
and the right of freedom of association.38
A. Legislation 
 Although one might believe that the Constitution and federal and 
state civil rights statutes protect minorities from discrimination at pri-
vate clubs, the anti-discrimination laws are applicable only to places of 
public accommodation, and therefore private clubs are usually beyond 
their scope.39 The U.S. Constitution, for example, does not offer a 
remedy for discrimination at private country clubs because the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to pro-
hibitions of state, not private, action.40 There are three common law 
tests, however, that when satisªed would trigger the Equal Protection 
Clause and could qualify a private club as a state actor: 1) the public 
functions test, 2) the state compulsion test, and 3) the joint action or 
“nexus” test.41 Unfortunately, theses tests probably would not make a 
                                                                                                                      
37 See Charpentier, supra note 1, at 113; Our Mission, supra note 17. 
38 See U.S. Const. amend. I; Rosner, supra note 5, at 137. When Martha Burk wrote a 
letter to Augusta National chairman Hootie Johnson urging the club to admit women, he 
responded deªantly stating, their “members are people who enjoy each other’s company 
and the game of golf” and their “membership alone decides [thei]r membership—not any 
outside group with its own agenda.” See id. at 181–82 n.294. He continued, “[t]here may 
well come a day when women will be invited to join our membership, but that timetable 
will be ours and not at the point of a bayonet.” Id. He ended the letter by hoping that “Dr. 
Burk and her colleagues recognize the sanctity of [the club’s] privacy.” Id. 
39 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); Nancy Kamp, Gender Discrimi-
nation at Private Golf Clubs, 5 Sports Law. J. 89, 92 (1998). 
40 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Id.; 
Kamp, supra note 39, at 92. 
41 See Kamp, supra note 39, at 92–93. The public functions test allows for a private en-
tity to be considered a state actor if the entity performs a function traditionally done by 
the government. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1946) (ruling that a privately 
owned town was a state actor). The state compulsion test looks to see if the state has be-
come so involved with the private action that the state seems to endorse the private con-
duct. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380–81 (1967) (holding state’s legislation allow-
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private club a state actor, and thus, the Constitution does not apply to 
discrimination at a private club.42
 In an attempt to offer remedies for private discrimination, Con-
gress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964.43 The Act contained various 
titles that dealt with speciªc areas of discrimination, such as discrimina-
tion in employment (Title VII), education (Title IX) and public ac-
commodations (Title II).44 Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
broadly proscribes discrimination in or by public accommodations, the 
act contains an express exemption for private clubs.45 The Act does not 
deªne “private,” which has led to various interpretations of the word 
and these interpretations have caused some clubs to comply with the 
standards of the Act.46 Determining whether a club is private has be-
come a fact-based question that courts have construed both narrowly 
                                                                                                                      
ing private discrimination lawful under California Constitution). The joint action or 
“nexus” test provides that a state action exists when a state enforces or upholds a discrimi-
natory contract or covenant. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1948) (ruling that a 
court’s enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). 
42 See Kamp, supra note 39, at 93. Under the public functions test, a court probably 
would not hold that a private club performs a government function. Id. Under the state 
compulsion test, Kamp reasons that activities of private clubs such as leasing publicly-
owned land or holding a liquor license generally do not rise to the level of state action. Id. 
Lastly, under a joint action or “nexus” test, a state action would not be found because the 
discrimination would be determined private and not judicially enforced. Id. 
43 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000); Kamp, supra note 39, at 94. 
44 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Kamp, supra note 39, at 94. Title II reads, “[a]ll persons shall be 
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as deªned in this sec-
tion, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2000). 
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e). This section provides that, 
[t]he provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to a private club or other 
establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the fa-
cilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons 
of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this section. 
Id. The subsection referred to above states that places of public accommodations include 
“[e]stablishments affecting interstate commerce or supported in their activities by State 
action as places of public accommodation; lodgings; facilities principally engaged in selling 
food for consumption on the premises; gasoline stations; places of exhibition or enter-
tainment; other covered establishments.” See § 2000a(b). 
46 See Bell v. Kenwood Golf & Country Club, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 753, 758 (D. Md. 1970). 
In Bell, the court held that a country club that prohibited members from bringing African-
American guests to the club was not a private club within the meaning of the exemption of 
the Civil Rights Act because it was owned by a proªt-making corporation. See id. at 753; 
Kamp, supra note 39, at 94. 
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and broadly.47 Because of the different interpretations that have arisen 
in federal courts, federal civil rights law is not the most effective or de-
pendable way for minorities to gain equal access to private clubs.48
 Because of the vague deªnitions in the Civil Rights Act, the ma-
jority of states have adopted their own form of civil rights legislation, 
but the laws “fall short of establishing a clear precedent to be followed 
in cases involving country club discrimination.”49 These statutes usu-
ally deªne public accommodations broadly, which may result in in-
cluding some country clubs within the protections of these laws.50 
Other states have adopted laws that speciªcally deal with discrimina-
tion at country clubs and are discussed below in comparison to Ken-
tucky’s response to private club discrimination.51
                                                                                                                      
47 See Jolly-Ryan, supra note 8, at 509. Courts may look at several factors, such as the se-
lective nature of the club’s membership practices, the history and purpose of the organiza-
tion, the use of facilities by non-members, the club’s size and the membership’s control 
over the club’s policies. See id. at 510–15. 
48 Kamp, supra note 39, at 95. Kamp also points out that Title II of the Civil Rights Act 
does not protect against gender discrimination and therefore a woman could not sue a 
private club for equal membership and privileges under the Act. Id. 
Interestingly, it has been argued that federal courts are hospitable places to litigate 
civil rights violations because they are more objective in their approaches than state courts. 
See Karl A. Cole-Frieman, Note, The Ghosts of Segregation Still Haunt Topeka, Kansas: A Case 
Study on the Role of the Federal Courts in School Desegregation, 6 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 23, 24 
(1996). In a discussion of Brown v. Board of Education, Cole-Frieman contends that the fed-
eral courts are the only institution insulated and powerful enough to protect the constitu-
tional rights of black children. See also Cole-Frieman, supra, at 37–38. See generally 347 U.S. 
483 (1954). Martin Luther King, Jr. once wrote: 
It was a great relief to be in a federal court. Here the atmosphere of justice 
prevailed. No one can understand the feeling that comes to a Southern Ne-
gro on entering a federal court unless he sees with his own eyes and feels with 
his own soul the tragic sabotage of justice in the city and state courts of the 
South . . . . But the Southern Negro goes into the federal court with the feel-
ing that he has an honest chance before the law. 
Cole-Frieman, supra, at 23 (citing Martin Luther King, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom 
151–52 (1964)). 
49 See Rosner, supra note 5, at 159. 
50 See id. These laws do not speciªcally discuss country club discrimination, but courts 
have interpreted anti-discrimination laws as including country clubs when the clubs meet 
certain criteria. Id. For example, if a club allows wedding receptions or fundraising events 
where guests enter the facilities, a court could ªnd the club to be a public accommodation 
under the state statute. See Kamp, supra note 39, at 101. 
51 See Rosner, supra note 5, at 159. Some states have simply included country clubs in 
the deªnition of “public accommodation” in their anti-discrimination laws. Id. at 166. In 
Kansas, for example, private clubs are included within the deªnition of public accommo-
dations if they have over 100 members, provide regular meal services, and receive payment 
for dues, services or use of facilities from non-members. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1002 
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B. Litigation 
 U.S. Supreme Court precedent has presented another issue in pri-
vate country club discrimination: a member’s right to freedom of asso-
ciation.52 In the 1980s the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of land-
mark cases that involved discrimination in private country clubs.53 In 
each case, the Court held that state legislatures that have enacted pub-
lic accommodation laws have a compelling interest in preventing dis-
crimination, which overrides a member’s right to freedom of associa-
tion.54
 In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the U.S. Jaycees, a non-proªt or-
ganization founded to “promote and foster the growth and develop-
ment of young men’s civic organizations,” brought an action challeng-
ing the Minnesota Department of Human Rights’ application of the 
state’s Human Rights Act.55 The Minnesota Human Rights Act forbids 
discrimination on the basis of sex in “places of public accommoda-
tion” and the Jaycees did not allow women to vote or hold ofªce in 
their organization.56 The Jaycees argued that the law requiring them 
to accept women as equal members violated the current members’ 
right of free association.57 The Supreme Court held that neither the 
right to intimate association nor the right to expressive association 
were violated by the Human Rights Act and that the state’s compel-
ling interest in eliminating discrimination justiªed the result.58
                                                                                                                      
(i)(2) (2000). In Florida, private clubs are subject to the state’s civil rights laws if they serve 
over 400 members. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.60 (1) (West 1997). 
52 See Rosner, supra note 5, at 146–47. The Supreme Court has ruled that “choices to 
enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against 
undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the 
individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984). 
53 See Kamp, supra note 39, at 96 (citing N. Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 
U.S. 1, 12 (1988)); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 
(1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)). 
54 See id. 
55 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612; Kamp, supra note 39, at 97–98. 
56 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614–15; Kamp, supra note 39, at 98. 
57 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615; Kamp, supra note 39, at 98. 
58 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; Kamp, supra note 39, at 98–99. Intimate association includes 
personal afªliations that are shown by certain characteristics and, therefore, involve per-
sonal relationships people have with one another. See Rosner, supra note 5, at 147. Expres-
sive association is part of the First Amendment because of the idea that “[a]n individual’s 
freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for redress of grievances 
could not be vigorously protected from interference by the state unless a correlative free-
dom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.” Roberts, 468 
U.S. at 622; Rosner, supra note 5, at 147. 
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 In Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 
the Supreme Court reafªrmed Roberts.59 When the Rotary Club of 
Duarte’s charter was revoked by Rotary International because it ad-
mitted women as members, the Duarte Club sued Rotary Interna-
tional for violating California’s public accommodation statute.60 The 
Supreme Court found for the Duarte Club by holding that Rotary 
Clubs did not have a right to intimate association and their right to 
expressive association was outweighed by the state’s interest in eradi-
cating discrimination.61
 Lastly, New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York in-
volved an amendment to New York City’s human rights law that 
banned discrimination by any “place of public accommodation, re-
sort, or amusement,” but exempted distinctly private organizations.62 
The law deªned “distinctly private” as follows: 
[An] institution, club or place of accommodation . . . shall 
not be considered in its nature distinctly private [if it] has 
more than 400 members . . . provides regular meal service 
and regularly receives payments for dues, fees, usage of 
space, facilities, services, meals or beverages directly or indi-
rectly from or on behalf of non-members for the furtherance 
of trade or business.63
After the enactment of the amendment, 125 private clubs ªled suit 
claiming that the law was facially invalid for being vague and over-
broad.64 The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and found the 
law valid, as it sufªciently deªned what constituted a distinctly private 
                                                                                                                      
When deciding if an intimate association would qualify for protection, the Court said 
that the “size, purpose, policies, selectivity, [and] congeniality” of the club should be taken 
into consideration. Charpentier, supra note 1, at 125 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627). 
The Court also found that the Jaycees did have a right to expressive association, but that 
the compelling interests of the state outweighed this right. See id. 
59 481 U.S. at 549. 
60 See Charpentier, supra note 1, at 126 (citing Rotary, 481 U.S. at 541). 
61 See Rotary, 481 U.S. at 546, 549; Kamp, supra note 39, at 99–100. Kamp points out 
that the Rotary Clubs did not have a right of freedom of intimate association because the 
“relationships within the Rotary were not of the intimate, familial type that are granted 
constitutional protection.” Kamp, supra note 39, at 99 (citing Rotary, 481 U.S. at 549). The 
Court found that some of the clubs had more than 900 members, there was a high drop-
out rate and many of the activities were completed individually instead of as a group. See 
Kamp, supra note 39, at 100 (citing Rotary, 481 U.S. at 546). 
62 See N.Y. State Club, 487 U.S. at 5; Kamp, supra note 39, at 100 (citing N.Y. City 
Admin. Code §§ 8-101, 8-102(9) (1986)). 
63 See Kamp, supra note 39, at 100 (citing N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-109(9)). 
64 See Kamp, supra note 39, at 100 (citing N.Y. State Club, 487 U.S. at 7.) 
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club.65 In the Supreme Court’s view, the private clubs that ªled suit 
were not distinctly private but “commercial” in nature because of the 
business deals and contacts that are created at these clubs.66 After this 
case, states like Kansas and Florida responded by passing laws similar 
to New York City’s law, which contain speciªc factors highlighting the 
commercial nature of clubs.67
 Roberts, Rotary and New York State Club are encouraging because in 
each decision the Supreme Court ruled in favor of non-discrimination 
over freedom of association for club members.68 The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s most recent look at the issue, however, could raise concern 
about the future of cases involving prejudice in private organizations 
of all kinds.69 In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, James Dale, a homosex-
ual member of the Boy Scouts, had his adult membership in the Boy 
Scouts revoked because of his sexual orientation.70 Dale sued, claim-
ing the revocation violated New Jersey’s public accommodation stat-
ute, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion in places of public accommodation.71
 The case eventually reached the United States Supreme Court, 
where Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority and reversed the New 
Jersey Supreme Court ruling in favor of Dale.72 The Court found that 
applying the state’s public accommodations law to the Boy Scouts vio-
lated its members’ rights to expressive association, relying on the fact 
that the organization had a mission to promote certain values.73 The 
decision could affect future cases that involve country club discrimi-
nation because, even though this case did not deal with intimate asso-
ciation, a private country club could make amendments to their by-
laws to convey that, like the Boy Scouts, they are organized to 
                                                                                                                      
65 See N.Y. State Club, 487 U.S. at 12. 
66 See Kamp, supra note 39, at 101. Kamp mentions that the Supreme Court did not 
rule out the ability for a private club to make a fact-based claim that it has special charac-
teristics to provide protection for freedom of association. Id. 
67 See id.; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.60 (1) (West 1997); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1002 (i)(2) 
(2000). 
68 See Rosner, supra note 5, at 155. 
69 See generally Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 655 (2000). See Rosner, supra note 5, 
at 155. 
70 530 U.S. at 645. 
71 Id.; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5–4 (West 2000). 
72 See id. at 643–44. 
73 See id. at 649. The Court concluded that the general mission of the Boy Scouts was 
“to instill values in young people” by encouraging “morally straight” behavior. Id. at 649–
50; Rosner, supra note 5, at 157. 
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promote certain values.74 With a few subtle changes to their rules, pri-
vate country clubs may be able to claim they are protected from gov-
ernment interference under Boy Scouts of America.75
C. Discussion of Commonwealth v. Pendennis, Inc. 
 The Pendennis litigation, a recent case regarding country club dis-
crimination, commenced in 1991 and concluded in 2004.76 Thirteen 
years after the case’s origination, Acting Executive Director of the 
KCHR, Morgan Ransdell, stated, “[t]his important decision by the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court demonstrates that the Commission has not been 
lax in its work, and . . . . [t]he Commission is vigorously striving to 
reach the goal set forth by the General Assembly in the Kentucky Civil 
Rights Act, namely to eradicate unlawful discrimination.”77 Ransdell 
went on to say that “[a]ll private clubs in Kentucky should sit up and 
take notice that the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet will deny business ex-
pense deductions regarding payments to private clubs that are found by 
the Commission to discriminate.”78
 It took a long time for the KCHR to demand that the clubs in 
Kentucky take notice.79 Although the original complaints alleged that 
Louis Coleman was denied membership to three clubs based on his 
race, the KCHR dismissed them, concluding that although the Com-
mission had the jurisdiction to investigate places of public accommo-
dation for discrimination, private clubs are speciªcally exempt from 
being classiªed as a public accommodation in the Kentucky Civil 
Rights Act.80 After the KCHR dismissed the complaints, Representa-
                                                                                                                      
74 See Rosner, supra note 5, at 158. Rosner presents an example of a club including by-
laws that a particular religion is against its beliefs. Id. at 158 n.160. This would most likely 
limit the possibility for followers of that religion from joining the club; a Muslim, for in-
stance, would not want to join a club that states that the Muslim faith is against its beliefs. 
Id. People of the particular religion could be members of a minority group in the United 
States and the country club would thus be discriminating without government interven-
tion. See id. 
75 See id. at 158. 
76 See Commonwealth v. Pendennis Club, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Ky. 2004). 
77 Press Release, Kentucky Commission on Human Rights, Kentucky Supreme Court 
Upholds Commission Decision to Investigate The Pendennis Club, The Louisville Country 





80 See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.130 (LexisNexis 1997); Brief for Appellants at 5, Com-
monwealth v. Pendennis Club, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 784 (Ky. 2004) (No. 2002-SC-00508-D); Ken-
tucky Supreme Court Rules in Favor of KCHR to Investigate Pendennis and Other Private Clubs for 
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tive Anne Northup, who sponsored the Revenue Code amendments 
that prohibited tax deductions for discriminatory clubs, was con-
cerned that the Commission had passed up an investigation that the 
new amendments ordered, and requested an opinion by Attorney 
General Fred Cowen.81 In November of 1991, the Attorney General 
issued an opinion that stated that the KCHR had the “legal authority” 
to investigate clubs to determine if they engage in discriminatory 
practices.82 He based this opinion on the Revenue Code, which stated 
that a determination of such practices was to be made by the courts or 
by “an agency established by the General Assembly and charged with 
enforcing the Civil Rights Laws of the Commonwealth.”83
 Two years after the Attorney General’s opinion, KCHR Commis-
sioner Mae Cleveland ªled complaints against each of the three clubs.84 
                                                                                                                      
Discrimination, Hum. Rts. Rep., Fall 2004, at 1–2, available at http://www.state.ky.us/agen- 
cies2/kchr/Fall%20newsletter%202004%20color%20for%20email%20%20web.pdf [herein-
after Kentucky Supreme]. The Coleman complaints contended that the clubs violated Ken-
tucky’s public accommodation law, but made no reference to the Revenue Code provisions 
which barred tax payers from deducting amounts paid to private clubs that have been de-
termined to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex. See Ky. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.120; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141.010(11)(d), (13)(f); Brief for Appel-
lants, supra, at 2, 5. Instead of prohibiting private club discrimination, Kentucky amended its 
Revenue Code in 1990 to terminate tax deductions for discriminatory clubs. See Ky. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 141.010(11)(d), (13)(f); Brief for Appellants, supra, at 2–3. Before it was 
amended, this state beneªt had the effect of subsidizing and approving discrimination. Brief 
for Appellants, supra, at 3. Under the amended provisions, state taxpayers cannot take: 
[a]ny deduction for amounts paid to any club, organization, or establishment 
which has been determined by the courts or an agency established by the 
General Assembly and charged with enforcing the civil rights laws of the 
Commonwealth, not to afford full and equal membership and full and equal 
enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accom-
modations to any person because of race, color, religion, national origin or 
sex. 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141.010(11)(d). This statute is “the genesis for the entire contro-
versy between the clubs and [the] KCHR.” Brief for Appellants, supra, at 2. 
81 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 5. Representative Northup wrote a letter 
asking if “the bill passed in 1990 implicitly grant[s] the Human Rights Commission the 
authority to make a determination of discrimination with regard to the clubs.” Id. at 5–6. 
She went on to assert that Kentucky “has a right to ensure that it does not continue to be 
an ‘enabler’ to discrimination.” Id. at 6. 
82 See id. at 6–7. 
83 See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141.010(11)(d), (13)(f); Brief for Appellants, supra note 
80, at 6–7. The KCHR is the only agency that meets this deªnition. Brief for Appellants, 
supra note 80, at 7. 
84 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 7. The Cleveland complaints speciªcally al-
leged that pursuant to the Revenue Code, “the Commission is authorized to take appro-
priate action and make the necessary determinations pursuant thereto.” See  Ky. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 141.010(11)(d), (13)(f); Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 7. Commissioners of 
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The clubs sought to dismiss these complaints, arguing that the KCHR 
was bound by its prior dismissal of the Coleman complaints.85 On 
March 15, 1995, the KCHR followed the Attorney General and denied 
the clubs’ motion to dismiss, reasoning that the KCHR had jurisdiction 
to investigate private clubs under the Revenue Code.86 At this point, 
the KCHR requested membership lists from the clubs, but they refused 
to turn over the information and ªled suit in federal court claiming 
that the request for lists violated their club members’ constitutional 
right of free association.87
 The U.S. District Court narrowly construed the Kentucky Civil 
Rights Act and the Revenue Code by holding that it was not within the 
KCHR’s statutory powers to investigate private clubs.88 Two years after 
this decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
reversed and vacated the decision, reasoning that the federal district 
court should have let state courts handle the case.89 Because the federal 
litigation was concluded, the KCHR made another request that the 
clubs reveal “bare statistical demographic information regarding their 
membership.”90 The clubs refused to provide the information, leading 
the KCHR to seek a judicial declaration in state circuit court concern-
ing the scope of the Commission’s investigative authority.91 Eventually, 
                                                                                                                      
the KCHR are allowed to initiate complaints under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. See  Ky. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.190(8); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.200(1). 
85 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 7. 
86 See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141.010(11)(d), (13)(f); Brief for Appellants, supra note 
80, at 8. 
87 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 8. In their brief, the appellants’ make note 
that although the clubs claimed that they did not engage in discriminatory membership 
practices, the clubs “sought to hide behind an asserted right of intimate association” and 
further alleged that the KCHR violated the civil rights of the club members by asking for 
membership lists. Id. The brief points out that the clubs have not provided any informa-
tion about their membership policies, “which many clubs openly display on their walls, for 
members and guests alike to see.” Id. 
88 See id. The KCHR argued that the opinion written by Judge Hood was ºawed be-
cause he mistakenly thought that the General Assembly could only grant the KCHR powers 
explicitly found in the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. Id. at 8–9. Alternatively, the KCHR al-
leged that the legislature gives state agencies’ powers in different Kentucky statutes. Id. at 
9. 
89 See Louisville Country Club v. Watts, 178 F.3d 1295, 1999 WL 232683, at *3 (6th Cir. 
Apr. 16, 1999) (unpublished per curiam). The Sixth Circuit decision was binding upon the 
parties and the U.S District Court dismissed the clubs’ federal case. See Brief for Appel-
lants, supra note 80, at 9. 
90 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 9. 
91 See id. at 10. The KCHR wanted a declaratory judgment afªrming the Attorney Gen-
eral’s opinion as well as a declaration stating that the Commission had the authority to 
investigate private clubs for the limited purpose of enforcing the Revenue Code provisions. 
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both the KCHR and the clubs ªled motions for summary judgment and 
the issue came down to whether the Revenue Code read in conjunction 
with the Kentucky Civil Rights Act granted the KCHR the authority to 
investigate private clubs to determine if they discriminate.92
 On August 29, 2000, a state circuit court issued a partial summary 
judgment in favor of the clubs, holding that the KCHR lacked statutory 
authority to investigate private clubs.93 After the Commission appealed 
in 2002, the Kentucky Court of Appeals afªrmed the state circuit court, 
reasoning that the drafters should have been explicit in granting the 
Commission the power to investigate private clubs in the Revenue 
Code.94 The KCHR then appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court.95
 Although Pendennis certainly involved the evils of discrimination, 
the Kentucky Court made clear that the case was not about whether the 
alleged discriminatory practices existed, but rather about statutory con-
struction.96 The question before the Kentucky Court was whether the 
KCHR had the statutory authority to investigate private clubs to deter-
mine if they discriminate.97 In the Appellants’ brief, the Attorney Gen-
eral and the KCHR argued that the General Assembly intended for the 
KCHR to investigate private clubs when it amended the Revenue Code 
provisions.98 Alternatively, the clubs argued in the Appellees’ Brief that 
the KCHR does not have such authority because neither the Kentucky 
                                                                                                                      
See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141.010(11)(d), (13)(f); Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 
10. 
92 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 12–13. 
93 See Commonwealth v. Pendennis Club, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Ky. 2004); Brief 
for Appellants, supra note 80, at 13. The court reasoned that if the author of the Revenue 
Code amendments intended to give the KCHR the authority to investigate, she would have 
explicitly stated that it had the ability to do so. Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 13. 
94 See Pendennis, 153 S.W.3d at 786; Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 14. 
95 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 15. 
96 See Pendennis, 153 S.W.3d at 785. The Kentucky Court began the opinion by outlin-
ing what the “case is not about.” Id. Justice Lambert wrote, “[t]his case is not about 
whether the clubs actually engage in discriminatory practices” or “the rights of clubs nor 
their members.” Id. He goes on to say, “[w]hat this case is about is whether the General 
Assembly has granted the KCHR authority to so investigate.” Id. 
97 See id. 
98 See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141.010(11)(d), (13)(f); Brief for Appellants, supra note 
80, at 15. The Attorney General and KCHR contended that the statutes should be inter-
preted to ascertain the intentions of the legislature. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, 
at 16. With that idea in mind, if the KCHR did meet the description in the Revenue Code 
of an “agency established by the General Assembly with enforcing the civil rights laws of 
the Commonwealth,” the appellants alleged that the statute would be meaningless. See Ky. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141.010(11)(d), (13)(f); Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 18. It 
certainly would not have been the intention of the General Assembly to enact a meaning-
less statute. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 17–18. 
328 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 26:311 
Civil Rights Act nor the Revenue Code expressly states this power.99 In 
addition to the statutory construction question, both appellants and 
appellees presented other arguments in favor of their respective 
views.100
 The Pendennis Court ruled in favor of the appellants and reversed 
the lower court decisions.101 The Kentucky Court held that although 
the Revenue Code does not explicitly authorize the KCHR’s investiga-
                                                                                                                      
99 See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.120; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141.010(11)(d), (13)(f); 
Brief for Appellees at 13–14, Commonwealth v. Pendennis Club, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 784 (Ky. 
2004) (No. 2002–SC–00508–DG). The clubs argued against an implied jurisdiction and 
stated that “nothing in the [Kentucky Civil Rights Act] or the Revenue Code authorizes the 
KCHR to embark on an intrusive investigation into the membership practices of clubs that 
have already been deemed private . . . .” See Brief for Appellees, supra, at 15. The clubs also 
contended that the private club exemption in the Kentucky Civil Rights Act prevents the 
KCHR from investigating private clubs. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.130; Pendennis, 153 
S.W.3d at 787. 
100 See Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 41–44; Brief for Appellees, supra note 99, 
at 25, 44. The Attorney General and the KCHR discussed the implications of the case at 
the end of their brief by stressing the problem of discrimination and the history of preju-
dice in private clubs. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 41–44. The appellants ar-
gued that this archaic practice of discrimination in country clubs has contributed to the 
small number of women and minorities in top business or government ªelds today. Id. at 
41–42. They noted that Tiger Woods would likely not be allowed to join some Kentucky 
golf clubs because “bigoted members would undoubtedly blackball him and argue this is 
their constitutional privilege.” Id. at 42. These passionate public policy arguments de-
manded a liberal interpretation of the statute in order to advance “the cause of equality 
and justice.” Id. at 44. 
The clubs responded with extreme examples by alleging that if the appellants’ argu-
ment were accepted, the KCHR’s jurisdiction would be without limit and “every family, 
business and religious organization in Kentucky” would be subject to the oversight of the 
Commission. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 99, at 25. In this same vein, the brief called 
the KCHR an “over-zealous agency” that would then be able to investigate any club “it arbi-
trarily presumes is immoral or bigoted.” Id. at 44. They also attacked the Commission by 
saying it stereotypically assumes “that golfers who look like Jack Nicklaus (but not Tiger 
Woods) are ‘evil.’” Id. In a Reply Brief, the appellants asked the Kentucky Court to ignore 
the clubs’ personal attacks and distortions. See Appellants’ Reply Brief at 10, Common-
wealth v. Pendennis Club, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 784 (Ky. 2004) (No. 2002–SC–00508–DG). They 
also requested that the Kentucky Court ªnd the legislative intent in the statutes “and if 
additional guidance is needed,” look to the public policy arguments. Id. 
Interestingly, Tiger Woods reportedly told Oprah Winfrey that he has dealt with dis-
crimination at country clubs and stated, “I got kicked off of golf courses numerous times; 
been called some pretty tough words to my face.” See Jolly-Ryan, supra note 8, at 498 n.28 
(citing Frank Whelan, Few Minorities at Country Clubs, Allentown Morning Call, June 5, 
1997, at D1). Despite his experiences with prejudice, Tiger Woods continues to play at the 
Masters Tournament at Augusta National and won, for his fourth time, the most recent 
Masters Tournament on April 10, 2005. See Terence Moore, The Masters: Dramatic Win at 
18th a Gift to Ailing Father, Atlanta J. Const., Apr. 11, 2005, at 1C. No professional golfers, 
including Woods, have boycotted the championship because of the club’s discriminatory 
policies. See Charpentier, supra note 1, at 112. 
101 See Pendennis, 153 S.W.3d at 785. 
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tory powers, they exist by implication.102 By looking at the purpose of 
the KCHR as well as the purpose behind the Revenue Code amend-
ments, the Kentucky Court concluded that the General Assembly had 
intended to prohibit discriminatory clubs from beneªting from tax 
deductions, and that the KCHR was legally entitled to investigate in 
furtherance of that goal.103
 Although Pendennis was a victory for the KCHR in that it clariªed 
the Commission’s statutory right to investigate private clubs, the Ken-
tucky Court points out several times in the opinion that private clubs 
have a constitutional right to discriminate based on race.104 Justice 
Lambert stated that the KCHR is authorized to investigate private clubs 
“[t]o assure that no such tax deduction is taken” and that neither the 
KCHR nor any court can force a club to discontinue its discriminatory 
practices.105 These qualiªcations are a reminder that nothing can bar 
these clubs in Kentucky from discriminating.106 The KCHR can investi-
gate a club, and if it discovers discriminatory membership practices, the 
Commission informs the Revenue Cabinet, and club members are de-
nied tax deductions.107 Although the tax consequences deter discrimi-
nation in private clubs and is a common strategy in many states for 
dealing with private club discrimination, tax consequences do not 
eliminate the discrimination itself.108 The blatant reminders in Penden-
                                                                                                                      
102 See id. at 789. The Kentucky Court highlighted the fact that the Revenue Code 
states that deductions will not be allowed for payments made to “any club” that has been 
determined to discriminate. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141.010(11)(d); Pendennis, 153 
S.W.3d at 788. The words “any club” show that investigations were not intended to be lim-
ited to “non-private clubs.” See id. at 788. Additionally, the Kentucky Court reasoned that 
since the Revenue Code clearly conveys that there is a power to make a “determination” as 
to discrimination, inherent in determining, is the power to investigate. Id. at 789. Pointing 
out that this proposition was established by Chief Justice Marshall, the Kentucky Court 
cited McCulloch v. Maryland, where the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that powers under 
the U.S. Constitution are not limited to what is explicitly enumerated in the text. See 17 
U.S. 316, 405 (1819); Pendennis, 153 S.W.3d at 788. 
103 See Pendennis, 153 S.W.3d at 787–89. Justice Lambert explained that the KCHR was 
established “to safeguard the rights of citizens to be free from discrimination on the basis 
of race and other enumerated characteristics.” Id. at 786–87. In order to accomplish this 
mandate, the KCHR was given the power to investigate and hold hearings. Id. at 787. 
104 See id. at 785, 789. Justice Lambert made clear that truly private clubs have the 
statutory right to discriminate in their membership policies “without fear of legal liability.” 
Id. at 785. 
105 Id. at 789. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. 
108 See Jolly-Ryan, supra note 8, at 521–24. For example, Minnesota prohibits property 
tax deferments and exemptions to clubs with ªve or more acres of “open space” that dis-
criminate. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 273.112 (West 1999); Jolly-Ryan, supra note 8, at 523. 
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nis that discriminatory practices are legal among private clubs cast a 
negative light on an otherwise positive decision and raise the question 
of whether the KCHR, given its goal of eradicating discrimination in 
Kentucky, can do anything else to stop discrimination in private coun-
try clubs.109
                                                                                                                      
California disallows deductions for taxpayers’ “expenditures made at, or payments made 
to, a club which restricts membership or the use of its services or facilities on the basis of 
age, sex, race, religion, color, ancestry, or national origin.” See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 
§ 24343.2(a) (West 2004); Jolly-Ryan, supra note 8, at 523. Professor Jolly-Ryan claims that 
prohibiting discriminatory private clubs from taking tax exemptions and deductions is 
“attractive from moral, social, and political standpoints.” Jolly-Ryan, supra note 8, at 524. 
She quotes Representative Northup of Kentucky, who said, “[w]e can’t force people to 
change who they associate with, but they should not enjoy any government beneªt at all if 
they choose to discriminate.” Id. 
The tax consequences for private clubs do not necessarily deter them from eliminat-
ing the discrimination in their policies. See Kamp, supra note 39, at 106. In 1986, the Mary-
land Legislature barred country clubs with discriminatory membership or guest privilege 
practices from qualifying for preferential tax assessment. See Md. Code. Ann., Tax–Prop. 
§ 8-212, -214 (West 2005). Burning Tree Country Club, located in Montgomery County, 
Maryland was informed that its lands would be assessed at their full cash value because the 
club restricted its membership to men. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 34. In 
State v. Burning Tree Club, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that governments do not 
have “to sanction, subsidize or support discrimination by private entities.” 554 A.2d 366, 
384 (Md. 1989); Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 35. The case permitted the Mary-
land tax assessor to retroactively apply taxes to the club which amounted to a reported 
$938,000. See Kamp, supra note 39, at 106. Despite the ªnancial loss and the dis-
qualiªcation from tax beneªts, Burning Tree still prohibits women from entering its 
grounds. See id. 
Interestingly, Burning Tree Country Club has appeared in the news again recently, 
displaying the idea that eliminating tax beneªts did not discourage the club from dis-
criminating against women. See Mihoces, supra note 5, at 3C. Martha Burk supported U.S. 
Representative Carolyn Maloney of New York’s introduction of a House resolution that no 
member of Congress, the federal judiciary or the executive branch should belong to a club 
that discriminates on the basis of sex or race. See H.R. Con. Res. 130, 108th Cong. (2003); 
Mihoces, supra note 5, at 3C. The resolution was a response to the controversy surround-
ing Augusta National, but also to clubs like Burning Tree, of which Senator John Warner 
of Virginia and Senator Don Nickles of Oklahoma are members. See id. Representative 
Maloney stated that by excluding women, these clubs are sending a message to women that 
“you are not our equal partner, and you do not deserve the opportunity to mix and mingle 
with CEO’s of America’s top corporations.” See Press Release, Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney, 
Maloney & Burk: It’s Time for Fair Play (Mar. 31, 2003), available at http://www.house. 
gov/maloney/press/108th/20030331FairPlay.html. The bill was referred to the House 
subcommittee on the Constitution on May 5, 2003. See GovTrack, H. Con. Res. 130[108]: 
Fair Play—Equal Access in Membership Resolution, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bill.xpd?bill=hc108-130 (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). 
109 See Pendennis, 153 S.W.3d at 785, 789; Our Mission, supra note 17. 
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III. Other State Approaches to Eliminating Country  
Club Discrimination 
 It may be difªcult for federal and state statutes to reach private 
clubs because usually they are not found to be places of public ac-
commodation.110 Some states, however, have enacted bold pieces of 
legislation that speciªcally address private club discrimination and 
more effectively discourage and, in some instances, ban prejudicial 
membership policies.111 Such measures addressed below indicate how, 
although Pendennis was a positive step to end discrimination, the Gen-
eral Assembly of Kentucky could go further to accomplish the KCHR’s 
goal of eradicating discrimination in the state.112
A. Connecticut 
 In 1997, the Connecticut Legislature, representing a state 
“known for its afºuent golfers and bucolic New England surround-
ings,” passed a law explicitly prohibiting discrimination at private 
country clubs.113 This far-reaching equal access law prevents a private 
country club that has at least twenty members and nine holes of golf 
and which either ªnancially proªts from nonmembers or holds a liq-
uor license from discriminating in its membership or access poli-
cies.114 It also requires that private clubs allow all members equal ac-
cess to the facilities.115
                                                                                                                      
110 See Kamp, supra note 39, at 92. 
111 See Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (West 2005); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571d (West 
2004); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:146 (West 2003); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 37.2301–
.2303 (West 2001). 
112 See Pendennis, 153 S.W.3d at 785, 789; Our Mission, supra note 17. 
113 See § 52-571d; Chervin, supra note 18, at 176. Chervin adds that “Connecticut has 
always been in the forefront of ensuring equality among all its citizens.” See Chervin, supra 
note 18, at 187. In furtherance of this point, he cites Evening Sentinel v. National Organiza-
tion for Women, which stated that the legislators of the state unambiguously displayed intent 
to abolish sex discrimination when it approved the equal rights amendment to the United 
States Constitution. See 357 A.2d 498, 504 n.5 (Conn. 1975); Chervin, supra note 18, at 186 
n.75. 
114 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571d. The statute provides in relevant part: 
(a) For purposes of this section, “golf country club” means an association of 
persons consisting of not less than twenty members who pay membership fees 
or dues and which maintains a golf course of not less than nine holes and (1) 
receives payment for dues, fees use of space, facilities, services, meals or bev-
erages, directly or indirectly, from or on behalf of nonmembers or (2) holds a 
permit to sell alcoholic liquor . . . 
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 After hearing testimonials from female country club members re-
garding the discriminatory practices of the clubs throughout the state, 
                                                                                                                      
(b) No golf country club may deny membership in such club to any person 
on account of race, religion, color national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status 
or sexual orientation. 
(c) All classes of membership in a golf country club shall be available without 
regard to race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status or 
sexual orientation. 
 . . . . 
(g) Any person aggrieved by a violation of the provisions of this section may 
bring a civil action in the Superior Court to enjoin further violations and to 
recover the actual damages sustained by reason of such violation or two hun-
dred ªfty dollars, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable 
attorney’s fee. 
(h) If, an action brought under subsection (g) of this section, the court ªnds 
that a golf country club holding a permit to sell alcoholic liquor . . . has vio-
lated any of the provisions of this section, it may, in addition to any relief or-
dered under said subsection (g), order the suspension of such permit until 
such time as it determines that such club is no longer in violation of this sec-
tion. 
Id. 
115 Id. The statute reads in relevant part: 
(d) A golf country club that allows the use of its facilities or services by two or 
more adults per membership, including the use of such facilities or services 
during restricted times, shall make such use equally available to all adults en-
titled to use such facilities or services under that membership. The require-
ments of this subsection concerning equal access to facilities or services of 
such club shall not apply to adult children included in the membership. 
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to affect the assessment by a 
golf country club of any fees, dues or charges it deems appropriate, including 
the ability to charge additional fees, dues or charges for access by both adult 
members during restricted times. 
(e) A golf country club that has food or beverage facilities or services shall al-
low equal access to such facilities and services for all adults in all membership 
categories at all times. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to re-
quire access to such facilities or services by any person if such access by such 
person would violate any provision of the general statutes or a municipal or-
dinance concerning the sale, consumption or regulation of alcoholic bever-
ages. 
Id. 
These provisions in the Connecticut statute are important because many private coun-
try clubs that open their doors to women continue to treat their female members differ-
ently than the males. See Charpentier, supra note 1, at 128–89. It is a common practice, for 
example, to restrict women to speciªc tee-times during the week and permit men to re-
serve weekend and holiday morning spots. Id. Another discriminatory custom at these 
clubs are “men-only grill rooms.” Id. at 129. Grill rooms are dining areas where women and 
children are forbidden to enter and male members can invite guests to conduct business 
discussions and network. Id. 
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the Connecticut legislature enacted the comprehensive law.116 The law 
forbids discrimination in private clubs, creates a private right of action 
for enforcement, and allows the state to suspend a club’s liquor li-
cense.117 The law—unlike others “without teeth”—places country clubs 
on notice that the state will no longer accept discrimination.118
 Although the statute goes further than many other states in at-
tempting to eliminate discriminatory practices, the legislators in Con-
necticut responded with mixed reactions.119 Those who voted against 
the bill argued that a club’s board of directors should have the author-
ity to change club policies, not the legislature.120 Others thought the 
best way to deal with the issue would be for women and minorities to 
                                                                                                                      
116 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571d; Chervin, supra note 18, at 177. 
117   Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571d. 
118 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571d; Chervin, supra note 18, at 179. Just after the 
law took effect, more than two dozen members of the Wethersªeld Country Club ªled a 
discrimination lawsuit, accusing the club of bias against women. See McEntee & Johnson, 
supra note 11, at 1; Club Is Sued in Bias Claim, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1998, at B9. Wethersªeld 
became the ªrst private golf club to be sued under the statute. See Club Is Sued in Bias 
Claim, supra, at B9. Wethersªeld opened its doors to women in 1991, at which point, mem-
bers’ wives who had previously been restricted to limited tee times were allowed to apply 
for full membership on their own and receive unlimited playing status by paying a reduced 
initiation fee of $4000. See Colin Poitras, Judge Rules Club Did Not Discriminate, Hartford 
Courant, Aug. 18, 1998, at A3. The plaintiffs claimed that the requirement to pay the 
initiation fee discriminated against women and violated the Connecticut statute. Id. The 
Middletown Superior Court judge concluded that the initiation fee did not circumvent the 
legislation and that the fees were at or below the level charged by other country clubs for 
similar memberships. See WCC Members for Fair Play v. Wethersªeld Country Club, Inc., 
1998 WL 646842, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 1998) (unpublished per curiam); Poi-
tras, supra, at A3. At the time of the lawsuit, of the 375 resident members, 374 were men. 
See id. 
119 See Chervin, supra note 18, at 179–80. Ironically, several powerful women in the 
state were opposed to the statute, while many males supported it. Id. at 179. The ªrst fe-
male president of the Hartford Golf Club, Valerie Bulkeley, was quoted as saying, “I am 
opposed to discrimination obviously. But when it comes to the internal workings of a club, 
I think you have to work that out within the club.” Id. (citing Maxine Bernstein, Female 
Golfers Looking to Strike Discrimination Aim to Eliminate Sex Based Biases at Private Clubs, Hart-
ford Courant, Apr. 1, 1997, at A3). Chervin makes note that Bulkeley’s statement does 
not take into account the fact that the majority of country clubs’ governing boards are 
male and will most likely continue to discriminate against women unless they are prohib-
ited from doing so by law. See id. 
120 See id. at 179–80. Connecticut State Representative Marilyn Hess, a member of the 
prestigious Greenwich Country Club, voted against the bill, saying, “why the legislature 
should have anything to do with it is beyond me.” Id. (citing Matthew Daly, Bill Would Give 
Women Country-Club Equality, Hartford Courant, May 8, 1997, at A3). 
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join non-discriminatory clubs.121 In the end, many legislators fully sup-
ported the bill and it was signed into law on January 1, 1998.122
 Although Connecticut is not the ªrst state to address the prob-
lem of discrimination at country clubs, its approach seems to be one 
of the most comprehensive in that it “provides speciªc legal and equi-
table remedies for a wronged party.”123 Other states that have statutes 
like Connecticut’s may only ban discrimination against clubs’ current 
members, while the Connecticut law uniquely prohibits a club from 
discriminating in member selection.124 Additionally, instead of simply 
                                                                                                                      
121 See id. at 180. In his testimony before the Connecticut State Assembly, State Repre-
sentative Michael J. Jarjura questioned why a woman would want to join a discriminatory 
club. Id. at 180 n.32. 
122 See id. at 177, 180. The bill’s sponsor, Representative Ellen Scalettar, asserted that 
“[p]eople are shocked this goes on in this day and age—but it does.” See id. at 180. Con-
necticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal lent his support to the bill, stating that, 
“clubs should be able to establish whatever rules they want,” but that “the state should not 
be a participant where there is illegal discrimination.” See id. 
A recent case involving the Connecticut statute was decided in July, 2004. See generally 
McNamara v. Tournament Players Club of Conn., Inc., 851 A.2d 1154 (Conn. 2004). In 
that case, Brian McNamara was a member of a golf club owned by the defendant and his 
membership was cancelled after he had a verbal dispute with another male member in the 
club’s locker room. See id. at 1156. A few months later, his wife applied for membership in 
the club, but was denied. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the refusal to admit her was “be-
cause, and only because, she is a woman who is married to the plaintiff Brian McNamara.” 
Id. The club contended that the denial of her application was based on her status as 
McNamara’s spouse and had nothing to do with her gender. Id. at 1158. The Supreme 
Court of Connecticut agreed with the defendant and found that the rejection did not con-
stitute gender discrimination in violation of § 52-571d. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-
571d; McNamara, 851 A.2d at 1164–65. Both plaintiffs testiªed that the atmosphere at the 
club was not discriminatory toward women, that she would have been admitted had she 
been married to someone else and the club had “never refused” an application by a 
woman. See McNamara, 851 A.2d at 1164. 
123 See Chervin, supra note 18, at 181. 
124 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571d; Chervin, supra note 18, at 181–82. For exam-
ple, New Jersey passed a similar law on August 1, 1997. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5–
12(f)(2)(West 2004); Chervin, supra note 18, at 181. The New Jersey law states that a pri-
vate club or association cannot 
directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any individual who has 
been accepted as a club member and has contracted for or is otherwise enti-
tled to full club membership any of the accommodations, advantages facilities 
or privileges thereof, or to discriminate against any member in the furnishing 
thereof on account of the race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, marital 
status, sex, affectional or sexual orienta-tion, disability or nationality of such 
person. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5–12(f)(2). This law’s limited scope has apparently been effective in 
curbing gender discrimination against existing country club members. See Rosner, supra 
note 5, at 166. Nonetheless, the law does not concern discrimination against nonmembers 
or membership practices. See id. Because of this exclusion, “the New Jersey law does not 
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denying a discriminatory club governmental beneªts, the Connecti-
cut statute bans discrimination at clubs explicitly and entirely.125
 A law like Connecticut’s furthers the KCHR’s goal of eliminating 
discrimination in its state because it provides a remedy and bans dis-
crimination.126 When comparing Kentucky’s Revenue Code and 
Pendennis to the Connecticut law, it is clear that the Kentucky General 
Assembly could do more to end discriminatory practices in private 
clubs.127 Such legislation would not just exempt these clubs from tax 
beneªts, but would aid in the effectiveness of the KCHR and further 
its goal of eradicating discrimination in the state.128
B. California 
 California has taken a different approach to help eliminate dis-
crimination in private clubs as evidenced by the state’s “public ac-
commodation” statute.129 This law, commonly known as the Unruh 
Act, states that, “[a]ll persons . . . are free and equal, no matter what 
their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or disability, 
or, medical condition [and] are entitled to full and equal accommo-
dations, advantages, facilities, privileges or services in all business es-
                                                                                                                      
further the ultimate goal of prohibiting” discrimination in private clubs. See Chervin, supra 
note 18, at 182. 
125 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571d (West 2004); Chervin, supra note 18, at 182–
83. In Iowa, for example, the Attorney General wrote an opinion stating that no personal 
tax deduction will be allowed “for Iowa income tax purposes, if a club imposes time 
and/or place limitations or restrictions upon the use of its services or facilities based upon 
age or sex.” See 1992 Op. Iowa Att’y Gen. 126, 1992 WL 470349, at *3 (Iowa A.G.); Chervin, 
supra note 18, at 182–83. The opinion makes clear that discrimination is not actually pro-
hibited, but tax deductions will be denied to those “who patronize private clubs which 
employ such restrictions.” See id. Iowa’s practice is similar to the Kentucky Revenue Code 
and equally ineffective when compared to Connecticut’s statute. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 
Ann. § 52-571d; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141.010(11)(d)(13)(f)(LexisNexis 2003); Op. Iowa 
Att’y Gen., 1992 WL 470349, at *3. 
126 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571d; Chervin, supra note 18, at 187; Our Mission, 
supra note 17. 
127 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571d; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141.010(11)(d)(13)(f); 
Commonwealth v. Pendennis Club, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 784, 789 (Ky. 2004). Chervin alleges 
that Connecticut should be applauded for attempting to eradicate discrimination in coun-
try club membership because “discrimination on any level should not be condoned.” 
Chervin, supra note 18, at 189. He goes on to praise the state’s “courage . . . to take on 
these exclusive fortresses of wealth and power . . . .” See id. at 189–90. 
128 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571d; Chervin, supra note 18, at 183; Our Mission, 
supra note 17. 
129 See Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (West 2005); Warªeld v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 
896 P.2d 776, 777 (Cal. 1995). 
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tablishments of every kind whatsoever.”130 Since the Unruh Act is very 
broad, judicial interpretation was needed to determine how the law 
would affect private clubs.131 Warªeld v. Peninsula Golf and Country Club 
provided this interpretation and can be looked at in comparison to 
Pendennis for how it furthers the eradication of discrimination.132
 In Warªeld, the plaintiff, Mary Ann Warªeld, claimed that the 
Peninsula Golf and Country Club’s membership policies violated the 
Unruh Act because they excluded women from holding full Regular 
Family Memberships.133 The plaintiff and her husband initially joined 
the club in 1970 when he was approved for a Regular Family Member-
ship.134 Her participation in the club increased over the years as she 
become a member of the “ladies golf team” and made valuable social 
and business relationships.135 Warªeld and her husband divorced in 
1981, and she requested that the board of directors transfer the Regu-
lar Family Membership previously held by her husband into her 
name.136 The board of directors refused her request and claimed that 
they were restricted by the club’s governing bylaws, at which point the 
                                                                                                                      
130 See Cal. Civ. Code § 51. Jesse M. Unruh, nicknamed the “Big Daddy” of the Cali-
fornia Legislature, served as state treasurer for twelve years and as Assembly Speaker for 
over seven years. Steve Lawrence, Insider Sheds New Light on Tempestuous Unruh Years, LA 
Times, Jan. 3, 1988, at 3. He was a white son of an illiterate Texas sharecropper and sup-
ported civil rights by introducing the Unruh Civil Rights Act in 1959. See Cal. Civ. Code 
§ 51; Kenneth Reich, Unruh Eulogized as Protector and Political Teacher, LA Times, Aug. 10, 
1987, at 3. 
131 See Cal. Civ. Code § 51; Rosner, supra note 5, at 160. Rosner, however, states that 
where the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is vague as to what deªnes a private organization, “the 
Unruh Act is unmistakably clear.” See id. 
132 See Pendennis, 153 S.W.3d at 789; Warªeld, 896 P.2d at 798. 
133 See Warªeld, 896 P.2d at 782. In 1981, the relevant time period for the case, the Pen-
insula Golf and Country Club’s facilities included a golf course, a driving range and put-
ting greens, tennis courts, a swimming pool, a clubhouse and a dining room, several bars, 
a ballroom, and golf and tennis shops. Id. at 778. At this time, the club had a variety of 
membership packages, “each carrying its own distinct set of privileges with regard to use of 
the club’s facilities.” Id. The “Regular Family Membership,” the category at issue in the 
case, was limited to 350 members of the club. Id. at 780. Under Peninsula’s bylaws, the 
holders of a Regular Family Membership had the right to vote for the club’s board of di-
rectors, serve as a director, or help in the decision-making process as to who can become 
new members. Id. These members also enjoyed the most privileges in regards to the club’s 
facilities. See id. In March 1970, the club’s bylaws were amended to limit Regular Family 
Memberships to “adult male persons” and not to “females or minors.” See id. at 781. 
134 See id. The selection process for membership involved an application, sponsorship 
by existing members, reviews by committees, a credit check and a ªnal approval by the 
board of directors. Id. 
135 See id. at 781–82. 
136 See id. at 782. In the plaintiff’s divorce settlement, she was awarded “all right, title 
and interest in and to the membership of Dr. and Mrs. Warªeld in the Peninsula Golf and 
Country Club.” Id. 
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plaintiff ªled a complaint for damages and injunctive relief.137 The 
issue before the California Supreme Court was whether the club 
qualiªed as a “business establishment” under the Unruh Act.138
 The plaintiff argued that by looking at the speciªc attributes of the 
club, the court could conclude that it was a business establishment and 
not truly private.139 For example, she contended that the size of the 
membership, “700 members plus their spouses and children” was too 
large to meet selective standards.140 She also argued that since non-
members could enjoy the club’s pro–golf and tennis shops as well as 
“sponsored events,” the club was inherently not exclusive to mem-
bers.141 The Court agreed with the plaintiff and found that the club’s 
members derived a direct and indirect ªnancial beneªt from the club’s 
business transactions with non-members.142 With this reasoning, the 
Court held that the Peninsula Club was a business establishment, not a 
private organization, and therefore had to comply with the Unruh 
Act.143
                                                                                                                      
137 See id. at 782. At the time of the lawsuit, the club’s bylaws provided that upon ter-
mination of the marriage of a Regular Family Member, “the Husband shall continue to be 
the Regular Family Member, and all rights, privileges and obligations shall be his.” Id. at 
781. The bylaws specify that, “[i]n the event of an award of the Certiªcate of Regular Fam-
ily Membership in the ªnal judicial action to the female spouse, and the male spouse does 
not forthwith thereafter purchase the female spouse’s interest . . . such Membership may, 
by action of the Board, be terminated.” Id. Interestingly, when the board of directors re-
viewed the plaintiff’s request in October, 1981, the club’s membership committee recom-
mended to transfer the membership to her. Id. at 782. 
138 See Cal. Civ. Code § 51; Warªeld, 896 P.2d at 783. 
139 See Warªeld, 896 P.2d at 792, Rosner, supra note 5, at 161–62. 
140 See Warªeld, 896 P.2d at 792, Rosner, supra note 5, at 161. 
141 See Warªeld, 896 P.2d at 792, Rosner, supra note 5, at 162. The plaintiff also claimed 
that the fact that only half of the members governed the club and membership selection 
showed that her entrance into the club would not affect the governance of the club. See 
Warªeld, 896 P.2d at 792, Rosner, supra note 5, at 161–62. Lastly, she maintained that “the 
opportunity for obtaining advantageous business contacts” was a vital element of her own 
membership, which displayed that the purpose could be viewed as business instead of so-
cial.Warªeld, 896 P.2d at 792, Rosner, supra note 5, at 162. 
142 See Warªeld, 896 P.2d at 779, 793; Kamp, supra note 39, at 103. The Court empha-
sized that the income derived from nonmembers was a product of “regular and repeated” 
business transactions. See Warªeld, 896 P.2d at 793 n.11. Isolated fundraisers would thus 
probably not make a private club a business establishment. See id. 
143 See Warªeld, 896 P.2d at 798; Kamp, supra note 39, at 103. Some have argued that all 
clubs that are used in furtherance of any kind of business opportunity should be catego-
rized as a public accommodation. See Jolly-Ryan, supra note 8, at 517. Jolly-Ryan, for exam-
ple, contends that by narrowly deªning a private club, these clubs will be forced to abide 
by the nondiscrimination rules for public accommodations and eventually, “the last 
stronghold of legal segregation” would be eliminated. See id. at 517–18. 
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 While not as comprehensive as Connecticut’s statute, the Unruh 
Act is written so broadly that many private clubs fall within its reach.144 
The Warªeld Court noted that a private club “is not automatically ex-
empt from the strictures of [the statute] simply because it characterizes 
itself as a ‘private social club.’”145 These words suggest the power of the 
Unruh Act, and show that such a statute might be a more effective 
route for a state like Kentucky to combat discrimination.146 Private golf 
clubs are scrutinized under such a law, and if found to be business es-
tablishments, are forbidden from using discriminatory membership 
practices.147 This kind of sanction is more meaningful than a prohibi-
tion of tax deductions and consequently, may better accomplish the 
KCHR’s goal.148
                                                                                                                      
144 See Cal. Civ. Code § 51; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571d; Rosner, supra note 5, at 
160. Although California’s decision to prohibit discrimination in private country clubs that 
qualify as business establishments was a courageous step, it has been criticized for not creat-
ing a clear rule as to when a private club constitutes a business establishment for the pur-
poses of the Unruh Act. See Warªeld, 896 P.2d at 798; Chervin, supra note 18, at 186. The War-
ªeld court did, however, consider several factors to determine whether a club is private or 
public, and other states could use these factors to make their statutes more speciªc. See Ros-
ner, supra note 5, at 161. These factors were: (1) the selectivity of the group in the admission 
of members, (2) the size of the group, (3) the degree of membership control over the gov-
ernance of the organization, (4) the degree to which club facilities are available for use by 
nonmembers, and (5) whether the primary purpose served by the club is social or business. 
See Warªeld, 896 P.2d at 791–92. 
145 Warªeld, 896 P.2d at 791. 
146 See id.; Rosner, supra note 5, at 161. Rosner states that the Warªeld Court’s warning 
that private clubs are not automatically exempt from the Unruh Act is an “important dis-
tinction” since “any establishment, no matter what its true purpose, could claim to be a 
private club in order to escape the legal burden of equal rights.” See Rosner, supra note 5, 
at 161. 
147 See Cal. Civ. Code § 51; Warªeld, 896 P.2d at 798. 
148 See Kamp supra note 39, at 106 (see discussion supra note 108); Our Mission, supra 
note 17. Massachusetts recently dealt with a case similar to Warªeld when nine women 
brought a sex discrimination case against a suburban Boston country club, alleging it en-
gaged in discrimination by offering them limited memberships. See Borne v. Haverhill Golf 
& Country Club, Inc., No. 966511C, 1999 WL 1411366, at *1 (Mass. Super. Nov. 19, 1999) 
(unpublished per curiam); Rosner, supra note 5, at 162–63. The women sued under a state 
statute that prohibits places of public accommodation from discriminating against “per-
sons of any religious sect, creed, class, race, color, denomination, sex, sexual orientation 
. . . in the full enjoyment of the accommodations . . . offered to the general public by such 
places of public accommodation, resort or amusement.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 92A 
(2000). The statute deªnes a place of public accommodation as a place “which is open to 
and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public and, without limiting the gener-
ality of this deªnition, whether or not it be . . . a place of public amusement, recreation, 
sport, exercise or entertainment.” Id. 
The plaintiffs successfully argued that they had suffered gender discrimination at the 
private club in violation of state law and a unanimous jury awarded them $1.97 million. See 
Rosner, supra note 5, at 162. The women described the discrimination through a variety of 
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C. Michigan 
 Michigan has used a different method to tackle the problem of 
private club discrimination.149 While it is not as direct and inclusive as 
Connecticut’s statute, it has been effective in bringing about equality 
for minorities in private clubs.150 Michigan’s law prohibits private clubs 
from denying individuals equal access to the club’s facilities.151 Addi-
tionally, Michigan’s Elliot-Larson Civil Rights Act (MELCRA) 
speciªcally includes private country clubs within the deªnition of a 
                                                                                                                      
evidentiary examples, including the fact that the only package available to women was the 
limited membership, which meant they were denied tee times on weekend mornings and 
during predetermined weekday blocks. See Borne, 1999 WL 1411366, at *2; Rosner, supra 
note 5, at 163. The Club limited the number of primary members, which received unlim-
ited tee time access to 320 members, of which only four were women at the time of the 
case. See Rosner, supra note 5, at 163. Additionally, if a woman tried to change her mem-
bership package, she had to pay an initiation fee, while a man making a similar change did 
not have to pay. See Borne, 1999 WL 1411366, at *4; Rosner, supra note 5, at 164. Because 
the club also rented out three function rooms to the public for banquets and meetings, it 
was found to be a place of public accommodation and subject to state law. See Borne, 1999 
WL 1411366, at *3; Rosner, supra note 5, at 162–63. 
After many post-trial motions, Judge John Cratsley of the Massachusetts Superior 
Court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting Haverhill Golf and Country Club from 
“making any distinction, restriction, or discrimination on the basis of sex in relation to any 
rights, beneªts, services, and/or privilege at the club.” See Rosner, supra note 5, at 164. He 
also demanded that the club provide gender discrimination avoidance training to its board 
members, keep records of its membership and wait lists, disclose the process of members’ 
rights to prospective applicants and provide the judge with reports of the application 
process. See id. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts afªrmed the trial court’s decision in 
2003 and the state’s Supreme Judicial Court refused to review the case. See Borne v. Haver-
hill Golf & Country Club, Inc., 440 Mass. 1101, 1101 (2003); Borne v. Haverhill Golf & 
Country Club, Inc., 791 N.E.2d 903, 919 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). 
Interestingly, the women started the case by ªling a complaint with the Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination, the state’s version of the KCHR. See Rosner, supra 
note 5, at 164; Lynn Rosellini, ‘Those women’ vs. the ‘Neanderthals’, Gender Politics at a Massa-
chusetts Golf Club, U.S. News & World Rep., June 12, 2000, at 56. At that time, a bar called 
the 19th Hole was open only to male members, but after the complaint, women were given 
equal access to the bar. See id. The plaintiffs claimed in the law suit, however, that they were 
still discouraged from entering, thus adding to the discrimination. See Rosner, supra note 5, 
at 164. An article written about the case shortly after the judgment, illustrated that feelings 
at the club had grown worse. See Rosellini, supra, at 56. One of the litigants described being 
“shunned” on the golf course and the author noted that “[m]ore than seven months after 
the court ruling, the atmosphere inside the 19th Hole could ice the Budweiser behind the 
bar.” Id. 
149 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 37.2301–.2303 (West 2001). 
150 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571d (West 2004); Rosner, supra note 5, at 166. 
151 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2302(a). The law states in relevant part that a per-
son shall not “[d]eny an individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation 
or public service because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, or marital 
status.” Id. 
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place of public accommodation.152 MELCRA was amended in 1992 to 
ensure that country, yachting and sports clubs were included in places 
of public accommodation.153 The amendment was adopted in order to 
eliminate exclusionary practices at private clubs, such as golf clubs re-
stricting certain times that spouses, typically wives, of members could 
use certain facilities.154
 On its face, Michigan’s approach appears to be comprehensive in 
that it speciªcally states that a country club is a place of public accom-
modation, but a closer reading reveals that the statute applies to the 
facilities of private clubs and therefore might not protect against dis-
crimination in membership practices.155 The Benevolent and Protective 
Order of the Elks v. Reynolds exempliªes this idea and suggests the stat-
ute’s shortcomings.156 In that case, the plaintiff, representing seventy-
three Michigan lodges of the Elks Club along with 50,000 members of 
those lodges, brought suit against the director of Michigan’s Depart-
ment of Civil Rights, alleging that MELCRA violated the Elks Club’s 
rights to intimate and expressive association “by prohibiting its gender-
based membership requirements and precluding its use of the private 
club exemption.”157
 Although the District Court acknowledged that the state legisla-
ture enacted the law to prohibit private clubs from restricting women 
from certain facilities and found that the law did not violate the Elks’ 
                                                                                                                      
152 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2301(a)(i). MELCRA reads: 
“Place of public accommodation” means a business, or an educational, re-
freshment, entertainment, recreation, health, or transportation facility, or in-
stitution of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or 
otherwise made available to the public. 
Place of public accommodation also includes the facilities of the following 
private clubs: (i) A country or golf club . . . . 
Id. 
153 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2301(a)(i)–(a)(iv). 
154 See Benevolent & Protect. Order of Elks v. Reynolds, 863 F.Supp. 529, 531 (W.D. 
Mich. 1994) (explaining the purpose and history behind the amendment to MELCRA). 
The statute involves the liquor license laws and provides that if a club does not comply with 
the provisions, the state can deny renewal of its liquor license. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 37.2304 (West 2001). 
155 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2301(a)(i); Kamp, supra note 39, at 104. 
156 See Reynolds, 863 F.Supp at 533. 
157 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 37.2301–2303; Reynolds, 863 F.Supp. at 530. The 
rules of the Elks Club provided that an applicant for membership must be a male citizen of 
the United States who is at least 21 years old, a believer in God, “of good character, not 
afªliated with the Communist Party, and does not advocate the forceful overthrow of the 
government.” Reynolds, 863 F.Supp. at 530. 
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right of intimate and expressive association, the court ultimately 
found that no genuine issue of material fact existed.158 The court held 
that MELCRA did not require the club to admit women as new mem-
bers because it only applied to individuals who were current members 
of that private club.159 Under Reynolds, the Elks Club was essentially 
prohibited from providing unequal access of its facilities to its current 
members or in other words, the club could not discriminate against 
men.160 Reynolds has been criticized as hindering equal rights in pri-
vate clubs.161
 Four years later, however, another case that involved the Elks 
Club and MELCRA had a very different and more effective result in 
terms of eliminating discrimination.162 Schellenberg v. Rochester, Michi-
gan Lodge No. 2225, of the Benevolent and Protective Order of the Elks in-
volved a woman who applied for membership to the Elks Club and 
was denied because of her gender.163 She brought the action, claim-
ing she was denied the full and equal enjoyment of the services of a 
place of public accommodation on the basis of gender in violation of 
MELCRA.164 The defendant, on the other hand, argued that it was a 
private club exempt from the act.165
 After a decision in favor of the plaintiff and a subsequent appeal, 
the defendant was ordered to reconsider the plaintiff’s application 
without consideration of gender.166 In 1994, seventy-one members of 
                                                                                                                      
158 See Reynolds, 863 F.Supp. at 531, 534 (holding that the statute does not affect the 
clubs’ membership policies and practices because the statute only applies to the facilities 
of private clubs). 
159 See id. at 533; Kamp, supra note 39, at 104. 
160 See Reynolds, 863 F.Supp. at 533. 
161 See Kamp, supra note 39, at 104. Kamp points out that the case never looked at the 
issue of whether a liquor license should be denied because it was not found that the Elks 
Club violated MELCRA. Id. She calls the decision “a major set-back for women’s rights” 
because the District Court discovered this “ºaw” in the statute. Id. 
162 See Schellenberg v. Rochester, Michigan Lodge No. 2225, of the Benevolent & Prot. 
Order of Elks of the United States of Am., 577 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). 
163 See Schellenberg, 577 N.W.2d at 166. 
164 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2101; Schellenberg, 577 N.W.2d at 166. 
165 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2303; Schellenberg, 577 N.W.2d at 166. This section 
of the statute states that the “article shall not apply to a private club, or other establish-
ment not in fact open to the public . . . .” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2303. It also makes 
clear that the particular section does “not apply to a private club that is otherwise deªned 
as a place of public accommodation in this article.” Id. 
166 See Schellenberg, 577 N.W.2d at 166. In 1989, the trial court found the Elks Club’s 
gender-based rejection of Schellenberg’s application a violation of MELCRA and the de-
fendant appealed. Id. The Court of Appeals found the club to be a place of public accom-
modation and public service and that it “lacked the selectivity necessary to be considered a 
private club exempt from the act.” See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2302; Schellenberg, 577 
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the Elks voted on plaintiff’s application for membership and ªfty-eight 
voted against her becoming a member.167 On the same evening, they 
voted on seven male applicants and all were approved as new mem-
bers.168 A week later, the plaintiff asked the trial court to order the club 
to accept her membership “with full and equal enjoyment of the ser-
vices, facilities, privileges, and advantages and that the Elks . . . be per-
manently enjoined from denying her the full and equal enjoyment of 
the club as long as she continued to pay her dues.”169 The court found 
in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the evidence established her 
prima facie case that she was treated differently because of her sex.170
 The Court of Appeals afªrmed the trial court’s holding and or-
dered that the plaintiff be admitted as a member.171 It found that she 
was a member of a protected class under the statute and that the Elks 
had been deemed a place of public accommodation.172 In establish-
ing the prima facie case, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant 
was predisposed to discriminate against women because of its rules 
and that the club acted upon that predisposition when the plaintiff’s 
application was denied.173
 Unlike Reynolds, Schellenberg suggests that Michigan’s statute can be 
extremely effective in eliminating discrimination in private clubs.174 By 
speciªcally including country clubs as a place of public accommoda-
tion, these clubs are prohibited from using discriminatory practices.175 
Additionally, cases like Schellenberg are a good warning to these clubs.176 
In light of these facts, Michigan’s route appears to be more effective 
than denying tax deductions and might better suit Kentucky’s goal of 
eradicating discrimination throughout the state.177
                                                                                                                      
N.W.2d at 166. Since the defendant was to be held to the standards of MELCRA, the trial 
court’s order that the defendant reconsider her application was afªrmed. See Schellenberg, 
577 N.W.2d at 166. 
167 See Schellenberg, 577 N.W.2d at 166. 
168 See Schellenberg v. Rochester, Michigan Lodge No. 2225, of the Benevolent & Prot. 
Order of Elks of the United States of Am., 577 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). 
169 Id. at 166–67. 
170 See id. at 167. The trial court stated that, “men who are otherwise qualiªed are ad-
mitted routinely, [but][p]laintiff’s application was overwhelmingly rejected by men who 
did not know her.” Id. 
171 See id. at 166. 
172 Id. 
173 Schellenberg v. Rochester, Michigan Lodge No. 2225, of the Benevolent & Prot. 
Order of Elks of the United States of Am., 577 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). 
174 See id. at 166, 169; Reynolds, 863 F.Supp at 534. 
175 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2301(a)(i); Rosner, supra note 5, at 171. 
176 See Schellenberg, 577 N.W.2d at 166, 169. 
177 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 37.2301–2303; Our Mission, supra note 17. 
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D. Louisiana 
 Like many other states, Louisiana mentions the rights of private 
clubs in its public accommodations statute.178 It is the only state, how-
ever, that explicitly identiªes speciªc criteria for determining when a 
club is truly private.179 To determine whether an organization is a pri-
vate club for purposes of the law, the factors to be considered are: 
(1) selectiveness of the group in adding new members; (2) existence of 
formal membership procedures; (3) degree of membership control 
over internal governance; (4) history of organization; (5) use of club 
facilities by nonmembers; (6) substantiality of dues; (7) whether the or-
ganization advertises; and (8) predominance of a proªt motive.180 By 
stating speciªc factors, the Louisiana law provides a successful example 
of how to deal with country club discrimination, as illustrated by recent 
case law.181
 In Albright v. Southern Trace Country Club of Shreveport, female 
members of the club challenged the club’s policy of restricting the 
use of a dining area known as the “Men’s Grille” to men only.182 The 
trial court found in favor of the club, but the Court of Appeal re-
versed and granted the plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive relief.183 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana looked at the statutory require-
ments to determine if the club was a place of public accommodation 
                                                                                                                      
178 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:146; Paula J. Finlay, Note, Prying Open the Clubhouse 
Door: Deªning the “Distinctly Private” Club After New York State Club Association v. City of 
New York, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 371, 383–84 (1990). 
179 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:146; Finlay, supra note 178, at 384. The law states, “[i]n 
access to public areas, public accommodations, and public facilities, every person shall be 
free from discrimination based on race, religion, or national ancestry and from arbitrary, 
capricious, or unreasonable discrimination based on age, sex, or physical or mental dis-
ability.” See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:146 § 49:146. 
180 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49: 146 (3) (a)–(h). 
181 See id; Albright v. S. Trace Country Club of Shreveport, Inc., 879 So.2d 121, 138 (La. 
2004). 
182 See Albright, 879 So.2d at 123. On March 26, 2000, four female members tried to get 
food service at the club and the Men’s Grille was the only restaurant facility open on Sun-
days. See id. at 126. The women entered the Men’s Grille and shortly after, they were ap-
proached by male employees who informed them they were not allowed in the Grille be-
cause they were women. Id. They were told they would not be served and were asked to 
leave the restaurant. Id. As the women were leaving, a member of the club yelled, “[d]on’t 
let the door hit you on the ass on your way out.” Id. When the women asked about the 
policy in the past, a former member of the Board of Directors told them that the Men’s 
Grille atmosphere would offend “ladies” because “all those men do in there is spit, scratch, 
and cuss.” Id. 
183 See id. at 123. The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted a writ to determine if the 
court of appeal used the proper standard of review and who had the burden of proof in 
such a case. Id. 
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and concluded that Southern Trace was a public facility, thus afªrm-
ing the Court of Appeal decision.184 While criticizing the club’s poli-
cies, the Court said that the Men’s Grille was “based on an inaccurate, 
stereotypical depiction of male behavior” and that the state’s laws “es-
pouse certain aspirational goals which limit gender discrimination” 
and these goals “impose an obligation to avoid arbitrary, capricious, 
or unreasonable discrimination based on gender.”185
 Albright is a positive decision in that it recognizes the need to 
ªght discrimination and uses the speciªc factors in the Louisiana 
statute to arrive at its conclusion.186 The goals mentioned in the case 
are the same as the KCHR and, once again, reºect another avenue for 
states like Kentucky to pursue in order to eliminate discrimination.187
IV. Recommendations 
 The Pendennis decision reºected the need to allow equal access to 
private clubs when it held that the KCHR has the statutory authority 
to investigate private clubs to determine if they discriminate in their 
membership practices.188 The Kentucky Court made clear, however, 
that private clubs in the state have the right to “discriminate in afford-
ing the beneªts of membership without fear of legal liability.”189 In-
stead of prohibiting discrimination in clubs, if such conduct is found 
by the KCHR, club members will be prohibited from deducting club 
payments on their state taxes.190 At the very least, in order to provide 
equal access, states should not subsidize the private clubs that dis-
criminate by providing tax exemptions and other government bene-
ªts that are in actuality funded by society.191 It is questionable, how-
                                                                                                                      
184 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:146 (3) (a)–(h); Albright, 879 So.2d at 128. The Court 
mentioned the eight factors and found that there was no selectiveness in the addition of 
new members and no evidence of membership requirements other than the ability to pay 
dues. See Albright, 879 So.2d at 128. Additionally, the members did not have a voice in gov-
ernance of the club, club facilities were consistently used by nonmembers, there was a 
considerable amount of advertising and there was a proªt motive. Id. 
185 See Albright, 879 So.2d at 137–38. 
186 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:146 (3) (a)–(h) (West 2003); Albright, 879 So.2d at 138. 
187 See Albright, 879 So.2d at 138; Our Mission, supra note 17. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court notes that the provisions of § 49:146 “provide an appropriate guide and analytical 
tool for the courts’ use in delineating between a public facility and a private club.” See Al-
bright, 879 So.2d at 128. 
188 See Commonwealth v. Pendennis Club, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 784, 789 (Ky. 2004). 
189 See id. at 785. 
190 See Kentucky Supreme, supra note 80, at 1. 
191 See Jolly-Ryan, supra note 8, at 528–29. Many states, including Illinois, Maine, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Utah, mandate holders of liquor licenses to 
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ever, if this route in and of itself is the most effective way to end dis-
crimination in private clubs.192 The recommendations below suggest 
alternative ways for states like Kentucky to accomplish the goal of 
eradicating discrimination.193
A. Following the States 
 Although a good solution to end country club discrimination 
would be federal legislation that speciªcally prohibited the clubs from 
doing so, the likelihood of such legislation being passed is slim.194 
While new state legislation might also be difªcult to pass for similar 
reasons, the end result of helping to eradicate discrimination may 
outweigh the fact that some state legislators are members of country 
clubs themselves.195
 An examination of the ways other states have handled country 
club discrimination demonstrates that the state of Kentucky can do 
more to accomplish the KCHR’s goal of eradicating discrimination in 
the state.196 A statute like Connecticut’s would be the most effective in 
eliminating discrimination since it explicitly forbids country clubs 
from discriminating against nonmembers as well as current members, 
creates a private right of action for enforcement, and allows for revo-
cation of a club’s liquor license.197 It was a bold step for Connecticut 
“to take on these exclusive fortresses,” and such a law in Kentucky 
                                                                                                                      
refrain from discriminating against women and minorities and threaten to conªscate the 
licenses of clubs engaging in such behavior. See Rosner, supra note 5, at 173. Rosner con-
tends that since socializing with friends is a beneªt of club membership, the loss of alcohol 
at clubs would likely result in members spending less time at the country club. Id. at 174. 
On the other hand, Kamp argues that denying property tax exemptions is the most prefer-
able of state laws that eliminate government beneªts to discriminatory clubs “because it 
avoids the associational defense which is often brought by private clubs.” See Kamp, supra 
note 39, at 107. 
192 See Kamp, supra note 39, at 106. 
193 See Our Mission, supra note 17. 
194 See Rosner, supra note 5, at 170. Rosner argues that new federal legislation is 
unlikely because many legislators are members of country clubs and many ªnancial con-
tributors to political campaigns are members of country clubs who would probably disfavor 
an act that negatively affected their interests. See id. at 171. 
195 See id. at 170–71. Rosner points out that state courts “champion equality at the ex-
pense of liberty.” See id. at 171. 
196 See Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (West 2005); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571d (West 
2004); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:146; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 37.2301–.2303 (West 
2001); Our Mission, supra note 17. 
197 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571d. 
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would certainly help end discrimination in the types of clubs chal-
lenged in Pendennis.198
 Instead of enacting an entirely new statute similar to Connecti-
cut’s, Kentucky could amend its public accommodation statute to fur-
ther the goal of eliminating discrimination.199 Kentucky could adopt a 
law similar to California’s Unruh Act, which would be effective in end-
ing prejudicial practices since state courts that have applied public 
accommodations laws to private clubs “have consistently held that the 
clubs are subject to these laws.”200 A law like the Unruh Act could be 
broad enough to reach country clubs and therefore help eradicate 
discrimination.201
 Kentucky could also amend its public accommodation statute to 
be more like Michigan’s, which speciªcally includes private country 
clubs within the deªnition of a place of public accommodation and 
demands that such clubs allow equal access to the facilities to all its 
members.202 This law was successful in granting a female plaintiff 
membership into the all-male Elks Club and could therefore further 
the KCHR’s goal.203 Alternatively, Kentucky could be the second state, 
after Louisiana, to amend its statute to add speciªc factors to consider 
for determining if a club is private.204 The Louisiana criteria gives 
courts a helpful guideline and can be interpreted to force country 
clubs to comply with the nondiscrimination provisions of the stat-
ute.205 These options present the opportunity for Kentucky to go fur-
ther to eliminate discrimination at country clubs and ultimately help 
accomplish the KCHR’s goal.206
                                                                                                                      
198 See Commonwealth v. Pendennis Club, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Ky. 2004); 
Chervin, supra note 18, at 189–90. 
199 See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.130 (LexisNexis 1997); Rosner, supra note 5, at 171. 
200 See Cal. Civ. Code § 51; Warªeld v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 896 P.2d 776, 
798 (Cal. 1995); Rosner, supra note 5, at 171. 
201 See id. 
202 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 37.2301–2303. 
203 See Schellenberg v. Rochester, Michigan Lodge No. 2225, of the Benevolent & Prot. 
Order of Elks of the United States of Am., 577 N.W.2d 163, 169 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); 
Our Mission, supra note 17. 
204 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:146. 
205 See Albright v. S. Trace Country Club of Shreveport, Inc., 879 So.2d 121, 128 (La. 
2004). 
206 See Cal. Civ. Code § 51; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571d; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 49:146; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 37.2301–.2303; Kamp supra note 39, at 106 (see dis-
cussion supra note 108); Our Mission, supra note 17. 
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B. Following the Leaders and Internal Change 
 While litigation and existing or new legislation may lead to the 
end of discrimination in private country clubs, it is important to con-
sider alternative methods of combating discriminatory policies as 
well.207 In any particular state, for example, local ofªcials and repre-
sentatives should have the courage not to join exclusive all-white or 
all-male clubs.208 Additionally, professional athletes should be encour-
aged to be socially responsible when choosing events in which they 
compete.209 Leading by example may effectuate change.210
 Perhaps the most effective and simple way to end discriminatory 
practices in private clubs is through the insistence of the club’s own 
members.211 The members usually have the power and inºuence to 
pressure the club to change its policies.212 While internal change ap-
pears simple in theory, it is actually difªcult due to the long tradition 
of discrimination within country clubs and the personal risks that 
come along with pushing for new practices.213 Looking at these meth-
                                                                                                                      
207 See Rosner, supra note 5, at 172. Such “back door” alternatives include “the curtail-
ment of the many government beneªts and privileges afforded country clubs.” Id. 
208 See Jolly-Ryan, supra note 8, at 527. Jolly-Ryan remarks that a candidate running for 
political ofªce should take into consideration an “exclusive private club membership as a 
possible skeleton in the closet.” Id. 
209 See Rosner, supra note 5, at 184. Interestingly, using professional athletes to combat 
discrimination has been done in the past. Id. Golf legend Tom Watson withdrew his mem-
bership at the Kansas City Country Club when it rejected Henry Block because he was 
Jewish and tennis star Serena Williams refused to play in the 2000 Family Circle Cup in 
South Carolina during an NAACP-led boycott surrounding the presence of the Confeder-
ate ºag waving atop the state capitol building. Id. If a player like Tiger Woods threatened 
to boycott a tournament played at a discriminatory club, the club would either have to 
change its policies “or host a tournament missing the sport’s biggest drawing card.” See id. 
at 186. 
210 See id. Rosner argues that professional golf tours might help end discrimination at 
the country clubs that host their tournaments by “making their membership requirements 
more rigorous and then imposing harsh sanctions on clubs that refuse to comply.” Rosner, 
supra note 5, at 183. The Country Club in Brookline, Massachusetts, for example, of which 
only two of the 1,300 members are African-American, was awarded the 2005 PGA Champi-
onship, but was unable to accommodate the size of the event. Id. at 181–83. If the PGA 
changed its direction and decided not to consider such a club as a host, the threat would 
bring negative publicity and might force the club to change its policies. Id. at 183. 
211 See Jolly-Ryan, supra note 8, at 529. 
212 See id. at 527–28. 
213 See Rosner, supra note 5, at 187; Rosellini, supra note 148, at 56. A member who ob-
jects to club practices may end up feeling ostracized or lose business from other members 
as a result. See Rosner, supra note 5, at 187–88. The women who successfully challenged the 
discrimination at Haverhill Golf and Country Club lost friendships and business contacts 
after the trial and several of the plaintiffs eventually resigned as members of the club. See 
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ods collectively in concert with the potential to amend or enact legis-
lation, demonstrates that Kentucky can and should go further to 
eliminate discrimination at private country clubs.214
Conclusion 
 Private country clubs are places “where contacts are made, corpo-
rate postures are relaxed, and deals are formed.”215 Because of the busi-
ness connection to these clubs, as well as the fact that there is a long 
tradition of discrimination in American country clubs against racial 
minorities and women, litigation and legislation have been launched to 
help minorities gain the equal advantage that white men have long en-
joyed.216 While many private clubs claim that they are private and thus 
able to operate free from government sanction, this is not always the 
case, and “the desire to attain equality for all members of society should 
take priority over the liberty interests of the country club.”217
 The Pendennis decision held that the KCHR has the statutory au-
thority to investigate private clubs to determine if they discriminate in 
their membership practices.218 The Kentucky Court made note, how-
ever, that private clubs still have the right to “discriminate in affording 
the beneªts of membership without fear of legal liability.”219 Instead 
of prohibiting discrimination in clubs, after an investigation by the 
KCHR, discriminatory club members are prohibited from deducting 
club payments on their state taxes.220
 The goal of the KCHR is to eradicate discrimination in the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky and although Pendennis is a step toward 
accomplishing this goal, a look at other state’s reactions to country 
club discrimination demonstrates that Kentucky could and should do 
more to further the KCHR’s goal.221 Other states explicitly prohibit 
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(Mass. Super. Nov. 19, 1999) (unpublished per curiam); Rosner, supra note 5, at 187–88. 
214 See Our Mission, supra note 17. 
215 See Kamp, supra note 39, at 107. 
216 See id.; Rosner, supra note 5, at 136. Rosner argues that country club discrimination 
should be given the recognition it deserves and “the legal, economic, and social support 
that is needed to make true change possible.” Rosner, supra note 5, at 192. 
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discrimination in country clubs, broadly deªne public accommoda-
tion, include country clubs as a place of public accommodation or list 
factors to take into consideration when determining if a club is truly 
private.222 Such statutes, when looked at collectively with other alter-
native measures, appear to better accomplish the goal of eradicating 
discrimination.223 Alternative legislation would demand that “[a]ll 
private clubs in Kentucky . . . sit up and take notice.”224
                                                                                                                      
222 See Cal. Civ. Code § 51; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571d; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 49:146; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 37.2301–2303. 
223 See Rosner, supra note 5, at 170–92. 
224 See Kentucky Supreme, supra note 80, at 2. 
 INSERTED BLANK PAGE 
 
